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The Political Safeguards of Executive
Privilege
David A. O'Neil 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079 (2007)
To an unprecedented degree, the nation's welfare now
depends on constitutionally sound outcomes to disputes between
Congress and the President over executive branch information. Yet
we still lack a satisfying theoretical account of the optimal method
for achieving those outcomes. In the years since Watergate, courts
and scholars have embraced a theory premised on an unexamined
faith that the Constitution's structure embeds in the political process
the tools and incentives necessary for each branch to vindicate its
interests. Judicial interference, this conventional model further
assumes, is both unnecessary and unwise; left to their own devices,
the political branches will pursue a salutary course of escalating
battle that will ultimately yield the correct constitutional balance in
any given information dispute.
This Article subjects that conventional theory to the rigorous
examination it has thus far escaped. It begins by dispelling the
notion that the theory describes a unique mechanism endemic to one
species of constitutional conflict. In fact, the Article reveals, this
conventional model is a faithful translation to the separation-of-
powers context of an approach that has long (and controversially)
governed the relationship between the federal government and the
states. Building upon that recognition, the Article exposes an
unjustifiable inconsistency between the conventional model and the
Court's treatment of broader executive- legislative disagreement. The
Article then assesses the model on its own terms, finding powerful
reason to doubt that the political process alone will produce a
satisfactory allocation of authority over information. Courts, the
Article concludes, must play some substantive role in a coherent
system for resolving interbranch conflicts of this kind.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal giants cast long shadows. The respect they command
from the bench and bar imbues their words with instant authority,
elevating their arguments above the realm of mere opinion and
creating the appearance of received wisdom. Over time, appearance
becomes reality. Scholars repeat those arguments, courts acknowledge
the resulting consensus, and soon, what began as a tentative
proposition becomes the controlling rule.
So it has been in the three decades since Archibald Cox, the
great "conscience of a nation,"1 penned his seminal article on the
nature of executive privilege.2 Fresh from his tumultuous five-month
tenure as the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Cox knew well of what he
spoke. His efforts to force the release of the infamous Nixon tapes had
not only cost him his job, but ultimately prompted the resignation of a
sitting President for the first time in U.S. history. Thus, when Cox
wrote about the legal doctrine he had wrestled-its constitutional
validity, historical pedigree, and manifestation in various contexts-
his views carried an undeniable weight.
Of the many insights in Cox's article, the most influential
relates not to the kind of criminal prosecution that Cox conducted, but
rather to the distinct topic of disputes between Congress and the
President over information in the executive's control. Cox focused his
discussion of that topic on the question of resolution: When a
See KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997).
Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
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congressional demand for information clashes with a presidential
claim of right to withhold, "who, if anyone, shall decide which shall
yield and when it shall yield?"3 He outlined an answer that has come
to dominate the field: Because this kind of interbranch conflict "lends
itself better to solutions negotiated through the political process than
to an 'either-or' judicial determination," 4 the federal courts should
"leave questions of executive privilege vis-a-vis Congress to the ebb
and flow of political power."5 If judges "remi[t] the Executive and
Legislature to their political battle," the branches themselves will
reach the constitutionally optimal result.
6
As we shall see, Cox had doubts about whether this approach
provided a complete answer. Those doubts, however, never seemed to
catch up with the theory itself, which quickly assumed a life of its
own. In the ensuing years, scholars have refined and embraced its
constituent elements, treating it as the self-evidently "correct" way to
resolve information disputes between the political branches.7 Courts
asked to decide such disputes have largely declined to do so, citing the
key premises of the model Cox outlined and resting on the faith that
the branches, left to their own devices, will get it right.8 So ingrained
is this theory, in fact, that those few scholars who perceive deficiencies
in the current process-centered regime have overwhelmingly
responded with process-centered reforms, apparently content that the
basic framework is sound.9 The approach, in short, has emerged as
something close to conventional wisdom. 10
3. Id. at 1387.
4. Id. at 1427.
5. Id. at 1432.
6. Id. at 1424.
7. See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 31-68 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress's Authority to Investigate the
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 784 (arguing that the political process may systematically
favor Congress to the detriment of good government but that "the appropriate response is one of
process"); Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and Political
Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL. 719, 745 (1993) (contending that any judicial role "should be confined
to reinforcing the political levers of one or both sides, and avoiding any resolution of the
constitutional issue on the merits"). This general consensus is not, of course, without exceptions.
Arguments urging a departure from the conventional approach typically begin with a
predisposition toward one branch or the other and then contend that judicial involvement is
necessary to counteract aspects of the political process that, for various practical reasons,
disadvantage the favored branch. See, e.g., Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional
Confrontations: Preserving A Prompt And Orderly Means By Which Congress May Enforce
Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 72 (1986)
(arguing that where high-level executive officials are involved, criminal prosecution by an
independent counsel is necessary to protect congressional interests); James Hamilton & John C.
Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes Precipitated by
Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 145 (1984) (citing the same concerns and
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This widespread acceptance, however, has occurred largely
through inertia, the product more of repetition and accretion than the
type of deliberate thought one ordinarily encounters in matters of
constitutional law. As a result, the conventional theory has received
remarkably little critical attention. Nowhere in the literature is there
a sustained effort to examine its underlying assumptions, to locate its
mode of reasoning within the realm of constitutional theory, or to ask
how it fits within the current jurisprudence on separation of powers.
Nor has anyone ventured to examine whether the theory and its
central assumptions furnish a compelling narrative about interbranch
dynamics and constitutional structure. Instead, the theory has
developed in relative seclusion. Information disputes, the literature
seems to assume, present a unique species of separation-of-powers
conflict, and this model presents an equally idiosyncratic means of
resolving them. Thus ensconced in its particular context, the theory
has escaped searching review.
Two developments-one theoretical, the other practical-
suggest that the time for a critical examination has arrived. First, a
growing body of scholarship addressing related areas of constitutional
law casts serious doubt on the basic premises that collectively define
and support the model Cox outlined. The model's isolated niche,
however, has sheltered it from the significant theoretical implications
of that scholarship. Second, in post-9/11 America, sensitive
information has become the key determinant of crucial policy decisions
and the lifeblood of the political branches-both for an executive that
considers control over information essential to its effort to safeguard
the public and a Congress that deems access to that information
indispensable to discharging its historic role as the "grand inquest of
the nation."" To a degree perhaps unprecedented in our history,
therefore, the country's well-being now turns on constitutionally
efficient outcomes to interbranch clashes over information. A matter of
such tremendous importance may well be best left to the political
process and beyond the reach of the courts. That conclusion, however,
must emerge not from unquestioned acceptance, but instead from the
crucible of rigorous examination and analysis.
arguing that Congress should enact a civil remedy to enforce subpoenas directed at the
executive); Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative
of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 687 (1997) (arguing that a civil remedy is necessary,
primarily because the media compares "every president who asserts executive privilege to the
worst image of Richard Nixon").
10. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 633-34 ("Observers have concluded that political
negotiation regarding access to information is effective and preferable to judicial adjudication.").
11. TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 9
(1955) (quoting 13 RICHARD CHANDLER, COMMON DEBATES 172 (1660-1743)).
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This Article serves as an effort to conduct that examination. It
begins, in Part I, by distilling from the literature a clear articulation of
the conventional approach and then tracing the courts' adoption of
that approach in the principal cases addressing information-access
disputes. Part II reveals that the conventional model is not, in fact,
endemic to its specific context, but rather represents an application of
a familiar theory of federalism that has sparked sharp debate ever
since it first appeared in the scholarship a half-century ago. Defining
the conventional approach and placing it in its proper context enables
an evaluation, in Part III, of the model's place in the Supreme Court's
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The result of that examination
shows that what is "conventional" in information disputes is wholly
anomalous elsewhere in the law governing executive-legislative
conflict, and further that no distinction can justify this radically
divergent treatment. The identification of the conventional approach
also informs Part IV, which puts existing law to one side and asks
whether, as a de novo matter, that approach nevertheless merits its
status because it accurately describes the functional implications of
constitutional structure and effectively channels the myriad pressures
that shape the relationship between Congress and the President.
Informed by recent scholarship on the nature of the political process,
this Part concludes that the conventional theory is unsound and its
premises unconvincing: There is no reason to believe-and, in fact,
powerful reason to doubt-that the political process alone will yield a
satisfactory allocation of authority in this context. Courts must play
some substantive role in a coherent system for resolving interbranch
battles over information.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO INFORMATION DISPUTES
A. The Escalation Model and Its Premises
The scholarship addressing information disputes between
Congress and the President speaks with a remarkably unified voice on
the critical issue of how such controversies are best resolved. Reduced
to its essentials, that scholarship contends that in any given conflict
over information, the Constitution's structural distribution of powers
will guide the political process to an optimal accommodation of the
competing interests of each branch. External standards imposed by
courts and judges, the literature assumes, will disrupt that organic
process.
This conventional approach consists of two primary elements: a
core rationale underlying the preference for political solutions, and a
2007] 1083
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set of three premises that together support the withdrawal of
information disputes from the courts.
The basic rationale begins by acknowledging that both
branches have legitimate, constitutionally based interests in the
disposition of information.1 2 The executive requires some level of
confidentiality over its papers and conversations to foster the
President's ability to receive candid advice and to ensure that he can
implement the resulting decisions with "activity, secrecy, and
dispatch."'13  Congress, in turn, requires some access to that
information to legislate wisely and to oversee the executive's
conduct. 14
The President and Congress, this rationale further assumes,
are in the best position both to evaluate the implications of any given
information dispute for their respective constitutional interests and to
weigh those interests against the costs of waging a battle to vindicate
them.15 Through the constitutional design of "checks and balances,"
each branch possesses powers sufficient to defend itself in a particular
dispute, but each knows that using such weapons carries a potentially
high price in political capital. 16 Thus equipped with the necessary
tools and aware of the stakes, the branches will engage in a
continually escalating political battle over the disputed information.
Every time one branch raises the ante, the other must decide, based
on the particular circumstances, whether to fight on or whether to
surrender. 17 At some point, this escalating process of mutual
evaluation and response will end when one branch concludes that the
continued expenditure of political capital does not justify the
institutional benefits of victory. That precise point, the theory
12. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111-14 (1996) (describing the competing interests
of Congress and the Executive).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
15. Alan B. Sternstein, The Justiciability of Confrontation: Executive Secrecy and the
Political Question Doctrine, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 140, 157 (1974) ("Each side must assess the
importance of its own position relative to that of the other side and determine to acquiesce or
stand its ground.").
16. Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of
Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 209 (1990) ("Congress and the President possess ample
political resources with which to protect their interests" and "also have the practical wisdom to
determine for themselves the stakes of any particular controversy.").
17. Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and The Struggle for Control of
Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 774 (2002) ("At each stage, each branch must
determine whether the fight is worth continuing, a determination that is surely influenced by the
strength of Congress's need for the requested information and the strength of the Executive's
need to withhold it.").
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maintains, provides the best approximation of the correct
constitutional balance between the branches.18 To capture the basic
mechanism at its core, we will call this theory the "escalation model."
The three premises that bolster this model proceed from a
common assumption: If the lifeblood of the escalation model is political
battle followed by a calculated surrender, the poison in that system is
litigation followed by judicial decree. The first such premise rests on a
generally dim view of judicial competence in institutional battles that
do not involve the Third Branch. Thus, because judges are not political
actors, they can only faintly perceive the true interests of Congress
and the President. 19 Dissecting the competing positions under the
judicial microscope will therefore yield only "a crude and precarious
substitute" for the branches' own assessments of the stakes of any
particular dispute. 20 Compounding this incompetence in identifying
the relevant interests is an inability to accommodate them: Courts
decide constitutional disputes through "balancing tests," which in
these circumstances require delicate political judgments of a type that
judges are ill-equipped to make. 21
Second, the escalation model shuns the judicial process not
only for its methods but also for its results. Unlike political solutions,
which extend no further than the specific dispute, judicial decisions
are inherently clumsy, drawing their force from doctrine and
reasoning that inevitably cast unintended shadows over future
controversies. 22 According to this premise, any fixed decision about
18. See, e.g., MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 83 (1994); Sternstein, supra note 15, at 157 (contending that the
result of the escalation process is an "ordering of priorities among collective interests by the
institutions best suited to the task."). Although this process is sometimes stated in terms of
"accommodation" or "compromise," the true dynamic described in the scholarship is adversarial,
for only that kind of unrestrained political struggle can produce a faithful accommodation of the
full range of powers that the Constitution divides between the branches. Professor Dinh, for
example, contends that "judgments about assertions of executive privilege against congressional
inquiries.., are best and properly made through a political process of give, take, and,
ultimately, compromise between these two branches," but he later clarifies that such
"compromise" occurs when Congress "use[s] its own constitutional prerogative to extort the
information from the executive by deploying [its] arsenal of coercive legislative weapons." Viet D.
Dinh, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 317, 346, 347, 353 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 18, at 353 ("The contingent nature of the valuation of both
the executive interest in confidentiality and the legislative need for information means that the
balance between the two is doubly contingent and therefore not fit for adjudication by the
judiciary."); Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 626 (1991) (contending that courts are "ill-equipped even to define clear
standards" and cannot discern the "political needs of Congress for particular documents").
20. Bush, supra note 9, at 732.
21. Cox, supra note 2, at 1426-27.
22. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and
Leverage, 52 DUKE L.J. 323, 401 (2002); Bush, supra note 9, at 745 ("The only tool available to a
court in resolving disputes is legal precedent, and legal precedent is much too inflexible to apply
2007] 1085
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access to information will inevitably diminish the flexibility of the
branches to reach different results in dissimilar conflicts. Such a
decision will also reduce the constitutional uncertainty considered
critical to ensuring that "[n]either the executive nor the Congress is
very sure of its rights," and thus that both enter the political fray with
"a tactful disposition not to push the assertion of their [prerogatives]
to abusive extremes."23 In other words, even if judges could perfectly
discern the constitutional balance in a particular dispute, their efforts
would do more harm than good because the opinions they write would
fundamentally destabilize and prejudice ongoing interbranch
dynamics.
24
The escalation model's third basis for rejecting judicial
involvement in executive-legislative information battles draws upon
original intent. 25 The Framers, this premise contends, deliberately
in individual cases of executive-legislative disputes."); Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent,
Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2003) (noting
that "the judiciary is not always able to foresee the implications of its decisions and [the] Court's
entry into interbranch and intergovernmental disputes often short-circuits a beneficial process
for resolving constitutional ambiguities (and securing other political goals)."); Yaron Z. Reich,
Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised Negotiation and Political Questions, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 466, 483 (1977) ("By creating a buffer area of related fact situations where
conduct is presumed to be controlled by the earlier decision, any substantive delineation of
authority would be likely to influence subsequent related interactions .... ").
23. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., The Executive's Right to Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 491 (1957); see Bush, supra note 9, at 746 ("Judicial resolution of
interbranch information disputes on the merits would set standards for future disputes and thus
create disincentives for political compromise and informal settlement practices."); Ronald L.
Claveloux, Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The
Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1350 ("A court ruling in a particular dispute might
hamstring either the President or Congress during future disputes in perhaps markedly different
political environments."); Cox, supra note 2, at 1426 ("Any binding definition of the power of the
Senate or House or Representatives to obtain the internal communications of the Executive
Branch and of the President to withhold them might greatly affect the relative political power
and effectiveness of the Executive and Legislative Branches."); Sternstein, supra note 15, at 162
("Interjecting the principled decisions of the courts into the process [of interbranch negotiation]
would tend to prejudice future choices between given collective interests when the options of the
majoritarian branches should remain unimpaired.").
24. Devins, supra note 12, at 110 (arguing that "greater judicial involvement risks more
harm than good"); Entin, supra note 16, at 222 ("Judicial opinions ... raise the stakes of any
particular conflict by clearly identifying winners and losers through formal explanations that
presumably will control other analytically related disputes .... Negotiated resolutions of specific
disagreements can decide smaller questions in ways that create a foundation for similarly
informal arrangements of future interbranch differences while recognizing the contrasting
interests of the governmental institutions involved."); Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since
United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation and Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127, 1129,
1139 (1999).
25. Jonathan L. Entin, Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 660 (2000) ('The constitutional design... afforded the political branches
ample resources with which to defend their positions without relying on the Judiciary to serve as
referee."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" The Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83
MINN. L. REV. 473, 490 n.52 (1998) (arguing that "these are matters probably best left to the
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distributed to the executive and legislative branches a set of reciprocal
political levers sufficient to counter attempts by either to exceed its
rightful authority or to interfere unduly with the operation of the
other.26 Madison's famous words in Federalist 51 provide the key
support:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The
provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the
danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
2 7
From this passage and the spirit it reflects, scholars have
inferred an intent by the Framers to embed in the basic structure of
the political process the necessary means for resolving information
disputes. And from their reading of the historical record, they have
concluded that this choice was a wise one-or at least that no harm to
either branch or to the Republic has come of it.28
B. The Model in the Courts
The escalation model has emerged preeminent not only in the
scholarship, but also in the courts. An important measure of that
influence, of course, is the cases that the courts have not decided. One
would expect that widespread acceptance of the escalation model
would dissuade both the branches from litigating information disputes
and the judiciary from entertaining them. Consistent with that
prediction, the branches have for the most part ceased to fight their
disagreements over information in court, largely because resort to
litigation is perceived as an act of desperation, rather than a
legitimate means of vindicating a legal prerogative, in a system where
the assumptions of the escalation model have become so ingrained.
29
As a result, the federal judiciary has not often engaged the respective
political process of constitutional tug-of-war between Congress and the President envisioned by
the framers").
26. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, Paying Ambition's Debt: Can the Separation of Powers
Tame the Impetuous Vortex of Congressional Investigations?, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 797, 797-800
(2000).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28. See, e.g., Wald & Siegel, supra note 17, at 743-45, 747 (describing the "long and
successful history of nonjudicial resolution of information disputes between Congress and the
President").
29. See, e.g., Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkanization Blog, http://balkin.blogspot.com
/2007/03/more-on-executive-privilege-bargaining.html (Mar. 21, 2007, 19:35 EST) (arguing that
by "invoking executive privilege and fighting the issue all the way to the Supreme Court," the
President engages in "an act of desperation" signifying that "he simply can't afford to let
Congress know what's been going on in his White House").
2007] 1087
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powers of Congress ana the President over executive-branch
information, and the Supreme Court has never definitively addressed
that question.
The impact of the escalation model is equally apparent,
however, from the cases the courts have resolved. In those decisions,
the federal courts have effectively supplanted the traditional legal
method with an unorthodox approach based squarely on the escalation
model's anti-judicial premises. This process began in the D.C. Circuit,
which stands "on the front lines" of the battle over executive-branch
information, and has continued in district court decisions building
upon the appeals court's assumptions. 30  The escalation model
therefore now occupies the core of the judicial doctrine governing
information-access disputes between the political branches.
1. The AT&T Opinions
The occasion for the D.C. Circuit's articulation and
endorsement of the escalation model was a controversy that erupted in
1976 when a House oversight committee, concerned about the effect of
intelligence activities on citizens' privacy rights, issued a subpoena to
AT&T requesting documents detailing the extent of the FBI's
warrantless wiretapping.3 1 Although AT&T stood ready to comply, the
White House resisted the subpoena on the ground that release of the
documents would undermine the executive's conduct of diplomatic
relations and ongoing intelligence operations. 32 Unable to persuade
the committee to settle for summarized or edited information, the
President instructed AT&T, "as an agent of the United States, to
respectfully decline to comply with the Committee subpoena."3 3 When
AT&T refused that instruction, the Justice Department sued to block
the company's compliance.
34
The district court permanently enjoined the subpoena's
execution, approaching the case much as it would any other.35 Abiding
by the judicial script, the court first framed the competing interests:
"On the one hand is the power of the Congress to investigate in aid of
the legislative function," and on the other "is the authority of the
Executive to invoke the claim of privilege concerning matters of
30. Wald & Siegel, supra note 17, at 778.
31. United States v. AT&T ("AT&T '), 551 F.2d 384, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
32. Id. at 386-88.
33. Id. at 387 (quoting letter from President Gerald R. Ford to the Honorable Harley 0.
Staggers (July 22, 1979)).
34. Id. at 387.
35. United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.D.C. 1976).
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national security, foreign affairs, or national defense." 36 The court
then subjected those dueling objectives to a familiar balancing test
that weighed "the necessity for compelling production" against "the
circumstances and grounds for the assertion of the privilege."37
Completing that analysis, the court placed its evaluation of each
branch's interest on the scales and ruled in the President's favor:
"[T]here are alternative means available for obtaining the
information"; the requested documents are "not absolutely essential to
the legislative function"; and the President's interest in confidentiality
therefore "outweighs the subcommittee's showing of necessity." 38
The D.C. Circuit rejected this framework, replacing it with a
fundamentally different approach that incorporated the key
assumptions of the escalation model. Most prominent among those
assumptions was the theme of judicial incompetence, particularly in
the very task the district court had undertaken: "To decide this case
on the merits," Judge Leventhal observed,
we would be called on to balance the constitutional interests raised by the parties,
including such factors as the strength of Congress's need for the information . . ., the
likelihood of a leak of the information in the Subcommittee's hands, and the seriousness
of the harm to national security from such a release.
3 9
Noting that any such effort would inevitably encounter "severe
problems in formulating and applying standards," the court
suggested-in line with the escalation model's core rationale-that "a
better balance would result in the constitutional sense, however
imperfect it might be, if it were struck by political struggle and
compromise than by a judicial ruling. '40 To this first rationale for
avoiding judicial interference with interbranch battle, the court then
added the second: "A court decision selects a victor, and tends
thereafter to tilt the scales" in future negotiations presenting different
circumstances. Especially where "nerve-center constitutional
questions" are involved, "[a] compromise worked out between the
36. Id. at 458-59.
37. Id. at 459-60 ("Here, the nature, the extent and the relative importance of the power of
one coordinate branch of government must be balanced against that of the other.").
38. Id. at 460. The district court's opinion largely tracked the reasoning of Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which
the D.C. Circuit refused enforcement of a subpoena issued by the Senate committee charged with
investigating the events of Watergate. That case arose when the committee, having learned of
the existence of tape recordings rumored to contain key conversations between the President and
his top aides, sued to enforce a subpoena seeking those tapes in the face of unyielding assertions
of executive privilege. Id. at 726-27. The appeals court dismissed the suit, holding that the
committee's asserted interest was "too attenuated and too tangential to its functions to permit a
judicial judgment that the President is required to comply with [its] subpoena." Id. at 733.
39. AT&TI, 551 F.2d at 391.
40. Id. at 391, 394.
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branches is most likely to meet their essential needs and the country's
constitutional balance."
41
Hoping for these reasons to avoid a decision on the merits, the
court ordered the branches to continue searching for a political
solution. 42 When talks again stalled, the case returned to the D.C.
Circuit, which adopted the tentative results of the negotiation process
but ordered ongoing attempts at compromise in an opinion that
emphasized the third, originalist rationale of the escalation model.
43
Contrary to each branch's assertion of "clear and unequivocal
constitutional title" over the field, the court explained, "it was a
deliberate feature of the constitutional scheme to leave the allocation
of powers unclear in certain situations."44 Thus,
The framers, rather than attempting to define and allocate all governmental power in
minute detail, relied ... on the expectation that where conflicts in scope of authority
arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote
resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective
functioning of our governmental system.
4 5
Removing interbranch information-access disputes from the
courts, in other words, is not simply an act of judicial pragmatism; it is
the recognition of a central aspect of the constitutional system, a
fulfillment of the Framers' intent to impose on each branch the
"constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a
realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the
particular fact situation."
46
The themes underlying the AT&T decisions have continued to
animate the judiciary's efforts to extricate itself from information
battles between Congress and the President. In the two such battles
that have since spawned litigation, the courts refused to declare a
substantive constitutional rule, opting instead to honor AT&Ts
overarching instruction to leave the answers to the political process.
Those courts less frankly acknowledged the basis for their decision-
both avoided the merits through questionable manipulation of
procedural barriers-but the reasoning in each case bears the
unmistakable imprint of the escalation model.
41. Id. at 394.
42. Id. at 395.
43. United States v. AT&T ("AT&TI'), 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
44. Id. at 127, 130.
45. Id. at 127.
46. Id.
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2. United States v. House
The first such decision, United States v. House of
Representatives,47 was the culmination of one of the "most protracted
and most deeply adversarial" information disputes in - recent
memory. 48 That controversy arose when a House subcommittee,
frustrated in its attempts to pursue concerns about the Reagan
administration's lax approach to federal environmental laws,
subpoenaed the personal appearance of the administrator of the EPA,
Anne Gorsuch, and ordered her to produce all executive-branch
documents relating to enforcement of the recently enacted
"Superfund" program. 49 When, on the instruction of President Reagan,
Gorsuch ignored the committee's order, she became the first agency
head in U.S. history to be held in contempt of Congress.50 The day
before Gorsuch's contempt citation was certified to the U.S. Attorney
for prosecution, however, the Department of Justice, acting in the
name of the United States, sued the House seeking judicial approval
of the President's assertion of executive privilege. 51
The district court declined to reach the merits, instead resting
on procedural grounds urged by the subcommittee. According to the
court, the proper vehicle for the executive's arguments was not a
preemptive civil complaint, but rather a defense to a criminal
contempt prosecution. 52 The court's solution raised obvious and
profound problems. It permitted the executive branch to fight a
finding of contempt only by vigorously prosecuting the very citation it
sought to establish as illegitimate, and it stood in considerable tension
with the Supreme Court's admonition in United States v. Nixon that
rigidly adhering to the contempt procedure is "peculiarly
inappropriate" and "unseemly" when doing so will delay the resolution
of an interbranch conflict. 53 The real motivation for these procedural
47. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
48. Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional
Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 205 (1992).
49. See House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 151; Claveloux, supra note 23, at 1335-36.
"Superfund" refers to a 1.6 billion dollar trust fund established by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), see generally 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-57 (2007), and designated to pay for cleanup of the most urgent hazardous waste
deposits and spills. For a detailed description of the Gorsuch controversy, see Claveloux, supra
note 23, at 1334-38.
50. Claveloux, supra note 23, at 1333-34.
51. See House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152.
52. See id. at 152-53.
53. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-92 (1974); see id. at 692 (noting that such an
approach "would present an unnecessary occasion for constitutional confrontation between two
branches of the Government"). Nixon involved a criminal proceeding in which the district court
had ordered production of the assertedly privileged materials, and the Supreme Court thus
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contortions, the court indicated, was unease in entering the fray
where "[t]he Legislative and Executive Branches of the United States
Government are embroiled in a dispute concerning the scope of the
congressional investigatory power."54 And the basis for that unease
quite plainly lay in the considerations identified in the AT&T
opinions. In what could be considered a fair pr6cis of those decisions,
the court advised that the "difficulties" in litigating the validity of the
executive's position-difficulties that were, of course, largely of the
court's own making-"should encourage the two branches to settle
their differences without further judicial involvement. Compromise
and cooperation, rather than confrontation, should be the aim of the
parties."
55
3. Walker v. Cheney
The second case, Walker v. Cheney,56 in many respects presents
a mirror image of the first. Like United States v. House, it stemmed
from congressional dissatisfaction with the President's allegedly pro-
business environmental practices. The particular controversy in
Walker centered on charges that Vice President Cheney, in chairing
an energy "task force," had allowed private energy interests to
exercise inappropriate influence over the group's recommendations.
57
Amid those suspicions, two congressmen asked the Comptroller
General, an agent of the legislative branch who heads the
congressionally-chartered Government Accounting Office ("GAO"),5 to
launch an investigation seeking information from the Vice President
about the group's meetings and deliberations.59 As in United States v.
addressed the analytically distinct "threshold question" whether the President could obtain
appellate review of that order only by disobeying it and raising executive privilege in defense to a
contempt prosecution. See id. at 690. Although the Nixon Court's allowance of immediate review
therefore does not control the situation presented in United States v. House of Representatives,
the spirit and rationale of Nixon plainly clash with the district court's adherence to a procedural
device that would delay resolution and engender further interbranch conflict.
54. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152.
55. Id. at 153.
56. Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
57. See id. at 54-55. Formally known as the National Energy Policy Development Group,
the task force was composed of a number of department heads and other federal officers invited
by the Vice President to participate. Id. at 55.
58. See id. at 53-54. Congress created the GAO in 1921 on the view that it " 'needed an
officer, responsible to it alone, to check upon the application of public funds in accordance with
appropriations.' " Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986). As the district court noted, both
Congress and the Supreme Court have "consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an
officer of the Legislative Branch." Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
59. See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 55. In particular, the Comptroller sought documents
describing (1) the attendees at the task-force meetings; (2) other parties with whom the task
force members and staff met to gather information; (3) the process by which the Vice President
1092 [Vol. 60:4:1079
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House, the executive declined to comply.60 This time, however, the
Comptroller General struck first in court, and the institutional roles
were therefore reversed: The legislative branch sought judicial
assistance in invalidating the executive's claimed right to withhold
information, and the President responded by urging abstention.
61
The district court again demurred on procedural grounds. The
Comptroller General, it held, lacked standing under Article III to
bring the suit, primarily because he asserted an impersonal injury-
the "abstract dilution of institutional legislative power"-rather than
the type of concrete and particularized harm the Constitution
requires. 62 Like the resolution of United States v. House, this detour
around the merits encountered some significant doctrinal obstacles.
The court's conclusion that denial of legislative access to information
cannot constitute an injury sufficient to confer Article III standing
appeared directly to contradict a line of cases predicated on precisely
that type of injury-including a 1998 decision by a three-judge panel
of the same court deeming it "well established that a legislative body
suffers a redressable injury when that body cannot receive
information necessary to carry out its constitutional responsibilities."
63
The court's tenuous efforts to distinguish those cases simply
highlighted the true basis for its hesitation.64 The case presented "a
decided whom to invite to participate; and (4) the cost incurred by the task force in forming its
recommendations. See id. at 58.
60. See id. at 57.
61. See id. at 58.
62. Id. at 67 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997)).
63. United States House of Representatives v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 86 (1998); see id. at 85 (holding that receipt of insufficient or incorrect information
"constitutes 'informational injury' sufficiently concrete so as to satisfy the irreducible minimum
of Article III"). The constitutional sufficiency of such an injury was implicit in Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which
the D.C. Circuit ruled on the merits of a suit brought by a Senate committee, and it was explicit
in AT&T I, where the same court deemed it "clear that the House as a whole has standing to
assert its investigatory power, and can designate a member to act on its behalf' by pursuing that
body's interests in court. United States v. AT&T ("AT&T 1"), 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
64. Those efforts purported to rest on Congress's failure either to subpoena the documents
itself or specifically to endorse the Comptroller General's suit. See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 70-
71. Even if those formal conditions were satisfied, however, the court's stated rationale for
rejecting the asserted injury would still apply. That injury, the court held, was inadequate
because "the import of the requested documents ... is essentially that the records will 'assist
Congress in the discharge of its legislative functions.' " Id. at 67. Injury to those "general
interests in lawmaking and oversight" was considered "too vague and amorphous to confer
standing." Id. Neither issuance of a subpoena nor a formal resolution supporting the suit could
change the nature of the legislative function for which the withheld information was sought.
In any event, even if the extent of congressional interest were somehow relevant to the
nature of the asserted injury, the court's reasoning rests on the flawed premise that only a
subpoena or formal resolution can indicate a level of interest sufficient to sustain standing.
Treating such action as a necessary precondition of suit would render wholly meaningless
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clear constitutional confrontation between the political branches,"
involving competing "visions as to the scope of congressional oversight
of the President-and thus the balance of power between the
Executive and Legislative Branches-that clash at the most
fundamental levels."6 5 Faced with such a monumental controversy, the
court deferred on the view that the best hope for a satisfactory
resolution lay in the checks and balances of the political process.66 As
long as that system afforded Congress alternative ways to seek the
information, 67 the court saw no license to impose its own view of the
proper outcome when "the Article I and Article II Branches have [long]
been involved in disputes over documents" without judicial
interference.
68
Together, these decisions define the law governing any attempt
by Congress or the President to bring an information dispute before
the federal courts. None, of course, fits perfectly within the theoretical
mold of the escalation model. The AT&T cases involved a form of
judicially supervised "negotiation" more constrained than the pure
political warfare in which the escalation model places ultimate faith.
Similarly, United States v. House and Walker v. Cheney rested on
procedural barriers that might in some theoretical circumstance
permit a decision on the merits, and to that extent stray from the
escalation model's unconditional rejection of judicial involvement.
These theoretical variations, however, simply underscore the broad
embrace of the model's core set of premises. The important point is
that the federal judiciary has all but eliminated any role for the courts
in resolving a key question at the heart of the Constitution's structure.
The assumptions that convinced the judiciary to do so deserve a close
look.
Congress's decision in 1980 to allow the GAO to sue in its own name to obtain information from
the executive branch. See 31 U.S.C. § 716(b)(2) (2004). In reality, moreover, Congress will not
idly abide a suit with which it disagrees in a matter so high profile as the Cheney litigation.
Indeed, when congressional sentiment turned against that litigation following the district court's
decision, the suit was promptly dropped. Richard Simon, Probe of Energy Task Force Ends, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at 17.
65. Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 61; see id. at 65 ("There is no doubt here that the issues
framed by the parties invoke core separation of powers questions at the heart of the relationship
among the three branches of our government.").
66. Id. at 72 n.18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 68; id. at 68 n.12 (citing United States v. AT&T ('AT&T If'), 567 F.2d 121, 130
(D.C. Cir. 1977) for the proposition that "[n]egotiation between the two branches should thus be
viewed as a dynamic process affirmatively furthering the constitutional scheme.").
68. Id. at 73.
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II. THE ESCALATION MODEL UNMASKED
At first blush, the escalation model seems peculiar, perhaps
unique, among constitutional theories. That model posits a question of
constitutional law-the boundary between presidential and
congressional authority-that is best determined through the outcome
of political struggles waged in the fashion of ordinary partisan
warfare. It recognizes the "legal" rather than political character of the
issue, 69 but it rejects the traditional legal mode of resolution, instead
equating the correct constitutional standard with the point at which
the power balance rests when the smoke of battle clears. Anomalous
as that arrangement may appear, however, it in fact describes almost
perfectly an approach that is entirely familiar to scholars of the
Constitution's vertical separation of powers between nation and state.
A. The Political Safeguards Theory
The political safeguards approach traces its roots to a
celebrated law review article in which Professor Herbert Wechsler
argued that the political process, not the courts, should determine the
constitutional balance between the federal government and the
states. 70 Inherent in the structure of the national government,
Wechsler maintained, are a set of structural protections-primarily
stemming from the composition of the federal government and the
methods for selecting its officers-that are designed to ensure full and
adequate representation of local interests. 71 The existence of those
69. The natural inclination, when confronted with an issue of constitutional dimension that
the courts elect not to resolve, is to label that issue a "political question" and assume that such a
characterization completes the taxonomical inquiry. In these circumstances, however, that reflex
would be a mistake. The escalation model defies easy description according to that "odd amalgam
of constitutional, functional, and prudential factors that have been used by the courts in
determining whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political question." Rachel E. Barkow,
More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 244 (2002). There is no "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962). As the D.C. Circuit explained in AT&T II, such conflicts present "a clash of
authority" in which "[n]o one branch is identified as having final authority in the area of
concern." AT&T II, 567 F.2d at 126. And although the theme of judicial competence in the
escalation-model literature might seem to bring the theory within the "prudential" variant of the
political-question doctrine, closer reflection reveals that this, too, is inapplicable. The escalation
model fundamentally rests on the assertion that judicial doctrine is unnecessary and unhelpful-
not that it is inherently inconceivable. As Professor Cox acknowledged, "[a] judicial robe renders
a man no less capable of making up his mind than an executive or legislator" and "courts do
develop criteria" when they "move into new ground." Cox, supra note 2, at 1430.
70. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
71. See id. at 546-58.
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"political safeguards" means that "the national political process in the
United States ... is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or
restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the
states."72 And because that federal-state balance is self-adjusting, "the
.[Supreme] Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of
the states, whose representatives control the legislative process and,
by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning [any]
challenged Act of Congress."73
The outlines of Wechsler's theory, refined and amplified by
subsequent scholars, 74 provided the theoretical basis for the Supreme
Court's foundational decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.75 In that case, the Court returned for a third time
to an issue that had deeply divided it twice before: whether the
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act may constitutionally apply to a state acting in its
"governmental" or "sovereign" capacity. 76 Lurking behind that narrow
issue were the more basic questions whether the Tenth Amendment
imposes any constitutional constraints on congressional regulation of
the states' core functions, and if so, whether the federal judiciary is
the proper vehicle for enforcing them.
Ten years before Garcia, in National League of Cities v. Usery,
the Court had answered both questions in the affirmative. On the first
issue, the Court held explicitly that "when Congress seeks to regulate
directly the activities of States as public employers, it transgresses an
affirmative limitation," derived from the Tenth Amendment, "on the
exercise of its power."77 And on the second question, the Court's basic
approach-deciding what congressional measures impinged on the
states' autonomy and identifying "traditional government functions"
immune from federal control 78 -implicitly declared that judges are the
designated keepers of the balance between "the federal government's
72. Id. at 558.
73. Id. at 559.
74. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
171-259 (1980); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux:
Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779
(1982).
75. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
76. The Court first upheld such an extension in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
over a dissent by Justice Douglas charging that the decision represented "such a serious invasion
of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent with
our constitutional federalism." Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976).
78. See id. at 833 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
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interest in regulating a function [and] the state's interest in
sovereignty over that function."79
In fundamentally reorienting the Court's approach to these
issues, Garcia gave concrete form to Professor Wechsler's political
safeguards model. The Court's new majority agreed with the basic
premise of National League: "States occupy a special position in our
constitutional system," and "the scope of Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause must reflect that position."80 "[U]ndoubtedly,"
these Justices thus concluded, the Constitution places "limits on the
federal government's power to interfere with state functions."81 The
Court overruled National League, however, because it disagreed about
the proper method for enforcing those limits.8 2 The states' essential
place in the federal system, the Court declared, is a product not of the
substantive lines drawn by Article III courts, but rather of the basic
structure and system the Constitution creates.8 3 Because the national
political process incorporates local concerns and ensures that federal
laws respect them, courts have no warrant to replace the results of
that process with their own preferences about the proper federal-state
balance.8 4 In short, Garcia held, "[s]tate sovereign interests.., are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations
on federal power."8 5
The embodiment in Garcia of Professor Wechsler's political
safeguards theory bears an obvious surface resemblance to the
escalation model. On the most general level, both reject judicial
involvement in disputes between structural components of the
constitutional system, instead remitting the power balance between
those bodies to the results of the political process. But the similarities
between the theories extend far deeper than this general agreement
on removing courts from the fray. Indeed, a close examination of the
structure of argument in Garcia indicates that although it addresses a
distinct set of relationships, the political safeguards theory in that
case shares each of the key premises and assumptions of the
79. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 n.89
(2004).
80. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
81. Id.; see id. at 549 ('The States unquestionably do 'retain a significant measure of
sovereign authority.' " (alteration omitted) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269
(1983))).
82. See id. at 547 ("What has proved problematic is not the perception that the
Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the
nature and content of those limitations.").
83. Id. at 550.
84. Id. at 551, 555-56.
85. Id. at 552.
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escalation model. In form as in function, the two theories are nearly
precise analogues.
B. The Premises Compared
Most fundamentally, Garcia shares with the escalation model
the core assumption that the federal political forum is uniquely suited
to an organic resolution of the clashing interests that drive disputes
between the Constitution's institutional actors. Just as the escalation
model contemplates an ongoing process in which each branch
mutually evaluates and asserts its interests through "political
struggle and compromise,"8 6 Garcia assumes that the political system
offers the best medium for identifying, expressing, and eventually
accommodating national and state concerns.
Both theories anchor this faith in constitutional structure. For
the escalation model, the central aspect of that structure is the
Constitution's finely balanced and self-reinforcing checks and balances
between the legislative and executive branches. When Congress and
the President, unhindered by courts, are left to deploy those powers in
a dispute over information, the final result is a fair approximation of
the correct constitutional line.87 In Garcia, the counterpart of those
reciprocal levers is the constitutionally designated methods for
selecting federal officeholders. Those methods, the Court maintained,
ensure that national politicians will reach and maintain office only if
they heed local interests. Citing Professor Wechsler and paraphrasing
his core insight, the Court explained that "the composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the states
from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the states a
role in the selection both of the executive and the legislative branches
of the Federal Government."88 Within this framework, when "the
people"-acting not through the courts but through their elected
representatives-decide "what services and functions the public
welfare requires" and what level of government should provide them,
those decisions reflect the interests of both state and nation.8 9 And the
result, like political resolutions of information battles, is therefore
presumed to reflect the proper constitutional balance.
86. United States v. AT&T ("AT&T 1'), 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
87. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
88. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (citations omitted); id. at 550-51 (noting that "the composition of
the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by
Congress").
89. Id. at 546 (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J.,
concurring)).
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The reasoning in Garcia also reflects the three further
premises underlying the escalation model's rejection of judicial
interference with the political process. First, the Court emphasized
the judiciary's relative incompetence in resolving disagreements
between the government's collective components. The immediate
cause for the Justices' reconsideration of the framework set forth in
National League was the federal courts' abject failure, after years of
struggle, to extract from that doctrine a principled approach to
determining which areas of state activity required immunity from
federal regulation. 90 That failure, in turn, had resulted from National
League's direction that the federal courts undertake the same two
basic tasks-evaluation and balancing of political interests-that the
escalation model deems beyond judges' capabilities. Thus, National
League required that courts first isolate and gauge the strength of the
states' asserted interests by asking whether the challenged federal
measure "regulate[d] the States as States," whether it "address[ed]
matters that are indisputably attributes of State sovereignty," and
whether it "directly impair[ed] the States' ability to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions."91 With the
results of that evaluation in hand, courts were then to engage in what
the members of the National League majority, reconstituted as the
Garcia dissent, candidly described as a "balancing test" requiring
judges to weigh "the federal interest in the challenged legislation and
the impact of exempting the States from its reach" against "the injury
done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause
enactments."
92
Garcia rejected this approach on the ground that courts are
simply not "equipped... to make th[e] kind of determination[s]" 93 for
which National League called. Whatever the method used to evaluate
the competing interests, and whatever the considerations guiding the
balancing test, judicial analysis informed by legal reasoning is a poor
90. The Court found it "difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle" in
those decisions and dismissed as "elusive at best" any distinctions the outcomes suggested. Id. at
539.
91. Id. at 537 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rel. Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 287-
88, 288 n.29 (1981) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)) (describing Nat'l League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
92. Id. at 563 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor); see id. at 562-63 (describing National League and subsequent cases as "adopt[ing]
this approach of weighing the respective interests of the States and Federal Government").
93. Id. at 545.
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surrogate for political outcomes produced by a system designed to
absorb and reflect the realities of institutional conflict.
94
Second, Garcia stressed that even apart from failures in the
judicial method, judicially decreed results yield a profoundly
destabilizing effect on the political process. The escalation model
assumes that court decisions ossify the relationship between the
branches and thereby threaten their dynamic interaction in future
information disputes.95 So too, the Court in Garcia concluded that
binding judicial definitions of the scope of state immunity from
congressional regulation would artificially limit the range of future
political responses to changing circumstances and thus distort the
optimal constitutional balance between federal and state power.
According to the Court, "the States must be equally free to engage in
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter
how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-including the
judiciary-deems state involvement to be."96 Because these popular
choices depend on political and historical contingencies, the Court
reasoned, "[t]here is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of
demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental
functions."97 Court decisions applying National League, however,
purported to impose just such an immutable line on the political
process. The result, the Court now explained, was a grave disincentive
for states later to assume functions held to be outside the judicially
protected sphere. States that so departed would incur the added cost
of exposure to federal regulation "when they me[t] the changing needs
of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a
different society left in private hands."
98
Third, in line with the escalation model's final anti-judicial
premise, Garcia justified the results of its holding on the basis of
original intent and historical experience. Leaving to the national
political process the task of defining the state's regulatory immunity,
the Court explained, is not simply a practical improvement over
litigation, nor is faith in that approach merely the by-product of a
fortuitous discovery about the mechanics of constitutional structure.
94. See id. at 545-47 (holding that any "judicial appraisal" requiring an evaluation and
balancing of competing interests is inappropriate in this context because "[a]ny such rule leads to
inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance").
95. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
96. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
97. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring)).
98. Id. at 546. A similar concern led the Court to reject the option of looking to history to
isolate essential state functions. "The most obvious defect of a historical approach," the Justices
explained, "is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes in the historical functions of
States, changes that have resulted in a number of once-private functions like education being
assumed by the States and their subdivisions." Id. at 543-44.
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Rather, the political-safeguards model is a faithful rendering of the
views and choices of the Framers themselves.9 9 Like the escalation
model, 100 Garcia placed heavy weight on Madison's writings in the
Federalist Papers, and in particular on his prediction that "the
residuary sovereignty of the States" would be "implied and secured" by
their equal representation in the Senate. 10 1 And also like the
escalation model, the Court then characterized the history of federal-
state relations as proof that Madison's predictions were correct. Not
only have the states "been able to direct a substantial proportion of
federal revenues into their own treasuries," the Court reasoned, but at
the same time "they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide
variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce
Clause." 10 2 In short, the political-safeguards model is the one the
Framers chose, and experience in that system shows that their
judgment was sound.10 3
The political safeguards theory thus distills to a familiar set of
premises. And the escalation model, rather than an idiosyncratic
collection of assumptions indigenous to the circumstances in which it
arose, is in truth a close translation to a new setting of a
constitutional theory that scholars have debated since it first
appeared in the federalism context more than a half-century ago.
The failure previously to make this connection is undoubtedly
both a cause and effect of the virtually unanimous acceptance of the
escalation model within its limited sphere. Perceptions of the
escalation model as essentially sui generis-a curious means of
resolving a unique kind of conflict-have sheltered that model from a
growing body of scholarship attacking the basic assumptions it shares
with the political safeguards approach. At the same time, the absence
of scholarly efforts to lift the escalation model out of its specific
context has hampered any attempt to compare the premises of that
model to those governing the courts' more general approach to
executive-legislative conflict. That comparison, which is critical to
testing the coherence of the escalation model within the broader
constitutional framework, is the subject of the next Part.
99. Id. at 551 ("The extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was
relied on to insulate the interests of the States is evidenced in the views of the Framers.").
100. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
101. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-52 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 315 (James Madison)
(B. Wright ed., 1961)) (emphasis in Garcia).
102. Id. at 552-54.
103. Id. at 552.
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III. CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT IN THE COURTS: THE CONVENTIONAL
APPROACH AS RADICAL DEPARTURE
The escalation model and political safeguards theory may
share a common structure, but they have drawn drastically different
receptions in their respective spheres. Where the former enjoys an
unquestioned acceptance as the conventional approach to information
disputes between Congress and the President, the latter has met with
little in the federalism context but derision and controversy. Garcia
itself drew dissents so scathing that, as Dean Kramer has quipped,
they "lacked only an actuarial table to indicate how soon the Court
could expect to lose its older, liberal members." 104 Commentators have
minced no words in lambasting the political-safeguards reasoning in
that case as everything from "fundamentally mistaken"10 5 to "a good-
hearted joke." 106 And although the core of Garcia remains, 10 7 the
Supreme Court has continued to chip away at its rationale in a series
of decisions imposing substantive limitations on the manner in which
Congress may regulate the states.108
Even that treatment, however, is charitable compared to the
experience of the political-safeguards theory where the issue is not the
104. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 217 n.ll (2000). Justice Powell wrote the principal dissent, attacking
the Court's decision point-by-point; then-Justice Rehnquist more economically declared that he
"d[id] not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a
principle that will, I am confident, in time command the support of a majority of this Court."
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580.
105. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001).
106. William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724
n.64 (1985).
107. Kramer, supra note 104, at 217 ("[W]hile Garcia has suffered both insult and injury in
recent years, its 'no substantive review' position is still the rule with respect to most questions of
federal power vis-A-vis the states, and Wechsler's article remains this position's chief intellectual
prop." (footnote omitted)).
108. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the Tenth
Amendment prohibits Congress from "commandeering" state legislatures in pursuit of federal
ends); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (extending the "anti-commandeering"
principle to congressional measures directed to a state's executive branch); Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (denying Congress power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate
the states' immunity from suit in federal court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
(interpreting the Tenth Amendment to prohibit Congress from subjecting nonconsenting states
to suit in their own courts). Scholars disagree about the effect of these decisions on Garcia's
continuing vitality. Compare, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1997) (arguing that "Garcia is no longer the controlling theory
concerning judicial review of federalism questions"), with Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 333 n.398 (1999) (contending that even after these decisions, the
"political safeguards of federalism ... remain the primary bulwark of state authority"). This
debate simply underscores what is the important point for present purposes: the political
safeguards theory continues to prove highly controversial in the federalism arena.
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vertical relationship between states and the federal government, but
rather the Constitution's horizontal separation of powers between
Congress and the President. In that context, the Supreme Court has
spoken with a clarity rarely encountered in the "incoherent muddle" of
separation-of-powers jurisprudence: Judges, not political processes,
draw the constitutional line between the branches.10 9
A. Political Safeguards in the Horizontal Context
If the escalation model's assumptions are trustworthy,
political-safeguards reasoning should find a natural home in all cases
of executive-legislative disagreement. Thus, where an Act of Congress
is challenged in court on the ground that it transgresses the boundary
separating legislative from executive authority, the now-familiar steps
of the escalation model would dictate a quick dismissal. The court
would note first that the branches themselves are best able to judge
the institutional implications of a pending measure, and the dynamics
of the political process, combined with the procedures for lawmaking
designated in the Constitution, afford ample means for expressing and
defending those interests. At least in the absence of a presidential
veto-override, the law's enactment therefore establishes its
constitutionality, for it signifies each branch's mutual calculation that
the institutional implications of the measure do not justify the costs of
defeating it.110 The court could then add that the legal method is ill-
suited to identifying and balancing core political prerogatives, and it
might also surmise that judicial decisions would disrupt the organic
process of political accommodation by encouraging the branches to
resort to litigation rather than fighting turf battles with the weapons
the Constitution provides. In support of all of this, the court could
invoke James Madison, who presumably spoke to the whole of the
executive-legislative relationship-and not just to information
disputes-when he located "the great security" of Congress and the
109. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1517 (1991).
110. Review of the constitutional and separation-of-powers implications of pending
legislation is a routine ingredient in the President's veto consideration. See, e.g., Memorandum
from the Office of Legal Counsel for the General Counsels of the Federal Government (May 7,
1996), reprinted in 63 J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 514, 560 (2000) (deeming it "imperative"
that the President "carefully examine ... pending legislation for [its] impact on the President's
ability to exercise his or her constitutional powers and carry out his or her duties"); see id. at 525
("Executive branch agencies should be careful to object to any legislation that.., undercuts the
constitutional purpose of creating an energetic and responsible executive branch."). Even where
Congress enacted a law over the President's veto, the political-safeguards approach might deny
the courts competence or authority to displace that result, which embodies the outcome of the
political process channeled through constitutionally designated lawmaking procedures.
2007] 1103
1104 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 60:4:1079
President in the possession by each of the "necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments [by] the
othe[r]."1ll
But courts presented with such cases have not followed these
steps. Indeed, they have done quite the opposite, repeatedly
supplanting the outcomes of the political process with their own
substantive conceptions of the legislative-executive balance. Even a
cursory review of the Supreme Court's canonical separation-of-powers
cases reveals a direct rejection of the political safeguards theory's core
premises. In Myers v. United States,112 and more recently in Buckley v.
Valeo,113 INS v. Chadha,114 Bowsher v. Synar,115 Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise ("MWA"), 116 and Clinton v. City of New York, 117 the
Court struck down on separation-of-powers grounds duly enacted
federal laws-laws that adjusted the interbranch boundary in ways
that had met with the approval of both Congress and the President.
The holdings in each case therefore implicitly declare not only that
judges are capable of handling politically-charged disputes between
the branches, but also that courts-not politics-present the proper
forum for a final and conclusive resolution of the Constitution's
horizontal structure. 118
The political safeguards approach has fared no better even
where the Court has upheld the challenged measure. In Nixon v.
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
112. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited the President from removing without Senate approval certain executive officers he
had appointed).
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
114. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 917 (1983) (striking down a "congressional veto" provision that
allowed either House of Congress to overrule the decision of the executive branch to suspend
deportation proceedings in a particular case).
115. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating a federal law intended to eliminate
the federal budget deficit by prescribing procedures under which the Comptroller General would
mandate cuts in spending whenever a deficit exceeded the statutory maximum).
116. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise ("MWAA"),
501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in creating a
Board of Review composed of individual congressmen and empowered to veto decisions of local
authorities regarding D.C. area airports).
117. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto Act,
which allowed the President to cancel certain items contained in validly enacted laws).
118. That some of these cases arose in the context of apparent harmony between the
branches, rather than from a challenge by one to the antagonistic action of the other, does not
distinguish them for present purposes. Indeed, the judiciary's willingness to reverse a resolution
that the President and Congress have agreed upon simply underscores the anomaly of its refusal
to step in where the branches dispute the proper constitutional balance.
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Administrator of General Services ("GSA"), 119 for example, the Justices
addressed a statute directing an executive-branch officer to retain and
control the disposition of former President Nixon's papers. The law
had sped through Congress, fueled by public outrage accompanying
the announcement that Nixon had struck a deal prohibiting disclosure
of any papers or tapes without his consent.' 20 President Ford had
signed the law, and President Carter sent his Solicitor General to
appear before the Court "vigorously support[ing] its
constitutionality."' 12' The political process, in short, had spoken with
unmistakable clarity.
The Court, however, chose not simply to defer to the branches'
own assessment of their institutional interests, implicitly rejecting the
position of Justice Powell's concurrence that "[s]ince the incumbent
President views this Act as furthering rather than hindering effective
execution of the laws, . . . it is not within the province of this Court to
hold otherwise."'122 In place of such deference, the Court formulated a
test that placed the fulcrum between executive and legislative power
squarely in judicial hands. "In determining whether the Act disrupts
the proper balance between the coordinate branches," the Court
reasoned,
the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress.1
2 3
The same process of judicial evaluation and balancing-the two
tasks that the political-safeguards approach seeks to remove from the
courts-has also guided decisions such as Humphrey's Executor v.
Rathbun124 and Morrison v. Olson,125 in which the Court upheld
119. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Although it involved congressional
action directed at presidential records, Nixon was not an interbranch information dispute of the
kind the escalation model addresses. Rather than a legislative demand for disclosure of records
from an unwilling executive, the law at issue in Nixon was an agreement by Congress and the
President about the proper way to handle information that would remain entirely within the
control of the executive branch. As the Court noted, the challenged Act "provide[d] for custody of
the materials in officials of the Executive Branch"; it "d[id] not make the presidential materials
available to the Congress-except insofar as Congressmen are members of the public and
entitled to access when the public has it." Id. at 443-44.
120. See id. at 431-32 (recounting how public announcement of the Nixon-Sampson
agreement was followed ten days later by the introduction of a bill to abrogate it).
121. Id. at 441.
122. Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
123. Id. at 443.
124. Humphrey's Ex'r v. Rathbun, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935) (upholding a provision of the
Federal Trade Commission Act conditioning the President's dismissal of a commissioner on a
finding of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
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congressional limitations on the termination of executive branch
officers only after reexamining for itself "whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty."
126
If these rulings do not conclusively demonstrate the general
rejection of the political-safeguards theory in controversies between
Congress and the President, the Court's words leave no doubt. In only
one opinion-and that, a dissent-has anything closely resembling the
theory appeared in a Supreme Court decision addressing the
executive-legislative boundary. Strongly opposing the Court's ruling in
Bowsher v. Synar, Justice White argued that the validity of a measure
bearing on the interbranch balance is
to be worked out between the Congress and the President through the legislative
process, which affords each branch ample opportunity to defend its interests. [Passage of
the] Act . . . represents Congress' judgment that [it] is 'necessary and proper' to the
exercise of the power granted the Federal Government by the Constitution; and the
President's approval of the statute signifies his unwillingness to reject the choice made
by Congress.
127
The Court squarely dismissed this reasoning, implicitly in the
Bowsher holding and explicitly in INS v. Chadha, where it brushed
aside in a footnote the suggestion that the challenged provision was
"somehow immunized from constitutional scrutiny because [it] was
passed by Congress and approved by the President. ' 128 In support, the
Chief Justice cited by analogy National League of Cities-the very
decision that Garcia and its political-safeguards reasoning later
overruled.1 29 And in Garcia itself, the dissenters pointed to the Court's
executive-legislative decisions as confirmation that "[t]his Court has
never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected
125. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (rejecting a challenge to the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, signed into law by President Reagan).
126. Id. at 691.
127. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 759 (noting
that the Court's holding serves "as a bar to the attainment of governmental objectives through
the means chosen by the Congress and the President in the legislative process established by the
Constitution"); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 917, 992 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
(describing the predecessor to the legislative-veto provision invalidated in that case as a
"compromise solution" that "[t]he Executive Branch played a major role in fashioning"). Justice
White's flirtation with this aspect of the escalation model should not be mistaken for a full
embrace. "Even the results of the constitutional legislative process may be unconstitutional," he
cautioned, "if those results are in fact destructive of the scheme of separation-of-powers."
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 769. But in his view, substantive review of those results must be highly
deferential, the Court's role "limited to determining whether the Act so alters the balance of
authority among the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic division
between the lawmaking power and the power to execute the laws." Id. at 776.
128. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13.
129. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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parties theoretically are able to look out for their own interests
through the electoral process."'130
Indeed, the Court's refusal to import the political safeguards
theory into this context has been even more direct, complete, and
explicit. According to the Court, "the fact that one institution of
Government has mechanisms available to guard against incursions
into its power by other governmental institutions does not require that
the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy."'131 Consistent with
that repudiation, the Court has by its own admission willingly
adjudicated many separation-of-powers disputes even where "the
branch whose power has allegedly been appropriated has both the
incentive to protect its prerogatives and institutional mechanisms to
help it do so." 13 2
Then-Justice Rehnquist, explaining the Court's basic
philosophy in his Nixon v. GSA dissent, put it perhaps most
succinctly. As an original matter, he observed,
[i]t could have been plausibly maintained that the Framers thought the Constitution
itself had armed each branch with sufficient political weapons to fend off intrusions by
another which would violate the principle of separation of powers, and that therefore
there was neither warrant nor necessity for judicial invalidation of such intrusion. 
13 3
"But that," he concluded, "is not the way the law has developed in this
Court."1
34
B. In Search of a Justification
The exercise in Part II-placing the escalation model in its
correct theoretical category-thus allows an examination of that
130. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 n.12 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
131. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393 (1990) (citing Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983)).
132. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 393.
133. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 559 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. Id. That Garcia's reasoning has not transferred to the Court's separation-of-powers
jurisprudence is not a novel insight, see, e.g., Ernest Young & Lynn Baker, Federalism and the
Double-Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DuKE L.J. 75, 129-130 (2001), but scholars continue to
resist it. A recent article by Professor Levinson, for example, contends that "[t]he political
safeguards view of federalism.., finds a close analogy in the way courts and theorists think
about the constitutional separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches."
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
950 (2005). The Justices have left little room for dispute that as a descriptive matter, that
analogy is largely incorrect. Thus, although it intends the opposite effect, Professor Levinson's
core contention-that political actors do not act to aggrandize their institutions, as the political-
safeguards theory supposes-in fact supports the Court's current approach to cases of executive-
legislative conflict. As Part IV explains, however, that contention also severely undermines the
coherence of the escalation model. See infra notes 191-214 and accompanying text.
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model in the broader context of executive-legislative conflict. And that
examination, in turn, reveals a striking inconsistency. Ordinarily,
courts presented with disputes implicating the constitutional
boundary separating Congress and the President will address and
decide such cases on the merits, explicitly rejecting any suggestion
that the branches should be left to settle their differences through the
political tools the Constitution divides between them. Where those
controversies center on disagreements about congressional access to
information, however, diametrically opposite reasoning prevails.
Selectively deploying a political-safeguards rationale that would
ordinarily be labeled "judicial abdication,"'135 courts suddenly perceive
in the constitutional design an unambiguous preference to leave to the
political process the task of drawing the constitutional line between
the executive and legislative spheres. The "extreme position" in the
non-informational case, in short, becomes the conventional position
where access to information is involved.136
One consequence of the escalation model's sheltered
development is that neither scholars nor courts have taken much
notice of this inconsistency. As a result, the scholarship contains no
sustained effort to identify a principled justification for the anomalous
embrace of political-safeguards reasoning in one corner of a field that
has for most other purposes unceremoniously rejected it. And in fact,
the search for such a defense proves fruitless. No coherent distinction
can separate information disputes from the disagreements presented
in cases the Supreme Court has decided on the merits.
1. The Constitutional Significance of Information Disputes
We can imagine several possible arguments that would purport
to distinguish information disputes from the broader category of
executive-legislative disagreements. One such defense, for example,
might posit some difference in the constitutional importance of the
controversies. According to this theory, information disputes may be
full of political sound and fury, but they signify very little about the
Constitution itself. Their causes are practical disagreements
implicating only the outer margins of each branch's constitutional
authority, their results little more than minor adjustments in an
ongoing political turf war. The cases that the Supreme Court has
resolved on the merits, in contrast, go to the core of the constitutional
135. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern". The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 491 (1991).
136. Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 441 (1986).
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design, raising basic questions about the structural safeguards that
shape the national political system. In deciding such cases, therefore,
the Court performs a critical role for which information disputes
provide no parallel-reinforcement of the Constitution's essential
processes and preservation of its integrity.
This defense falters on a deeply flawed premise. To be sure, the
executive-legislative cases that fill the U.S. Reports implicate issues
vital to the division of power between the political branches. Disputes
about the bicameralism requirement and Presentment Clause call on
courts to enforce the steps necessary to make binding law and thereby
justify faith that the substantive results of the political process
accurately reflect each branch's full consideration and influence. 137
Decisions such as Bowsher and MWAA ensure that Congress's power
to create legislation does not creep into the President's power to
execute it, forestalling the accumulation of functions within a single
department-according to the Framers, "the very definition of
tyranny."138  And judicial resolution of removal-power and
Appointments Clause cases proceeds from the recognition both that a
certain degree of presidential control over subordinate officers is
critical to a unified executive, and that a unified executive, in turn, is
indispensable to the proper functioning of the constitutional system. 139
This characterization, however, does nothing to distinguish
interbranch information disputes, which turn on questions about
congressional powers and presidential prerogatives that are no less
structural in the constitutional sense. Thus, Congress's power to
demand executive-branch information both derives from and enables
its core lawmaking function. 140 As the Supreme Court has noted, the
authority of Congress to obtain information "is as penetrating and far-
reaching as [its] potential power to enact and appropriate under the
Constitution."' 141 The converse is also true: The power to enact and
appropriate cannot extend beyond Congress's ability to demand the
137. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 917, 951 (1983); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 440 (1998).
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986).
139. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act against a challenge based, inter alia, on the
Appointment Clause and separation-of-powers principle); Humphrey's Ex'r v. Rathbun, 295 U.S.
602, 629-30 (1935) (rejecting on the merits a challenge to a law that placed restrictions on the
President's power to remove Federal Trade Commissioners); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).
140. See McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) ("[T]he power of inquiry-with
process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."); see
also Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
141. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
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information necessary to discharge those duties.142 Because "[t]he
proper exercise of [all] congressional functions ... presupposes the
existence of an informed judgment,"143 and because the executive
branch is "the repository of the country's most important information
for public policy formulation,"1 44 Congress's authority to demand that
information is arguably the primary structural component of its
ability to participate effectively in the political process.
By the same token, the President's right to withhold
information from Congress is "fundamental to the operation of
Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution."1 45 Most centrally, that prerogative fosters the basic
process by which the President reaches decisions: by preserving the
confidentiality of "candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions,"
it allows the President "to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately."' 46 The constitutional
design depends at least as much on this structural safeguard of the
quality of executive decision making as it does on procedural
guarantees of participation in the political process. Without the ability
to decide what its best interests are, the executive branch is helped
142. Devins, supra note 12, at 111 ("Absent access to accurate, relevant information, it would
probably be impossible to legislate either effectively or wisely."); James M. Landis, Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigations, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 209 ("To deny
Congress power to acquaint itself with facts is equivalent to requiring it to prescribe remedies in
darkness.").
143. Bernard Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 CAL.
L. REV. 3, 10-11 (1959). Woodrow Wilson's statement of this position remains one of the most
forceful:
Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the
disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be
helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these
things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in
embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that
it should understand and direct.
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 297-303 (1885).
144. Wald & Siegel, supra note 17, at 739.
145. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
146. Id.; see also Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (describing the "Article II right to confidential communications" as allowing the
President to "deliberate in confidence" and thus to "decide and act quickly-a quality lacking in
the government established by the Articles of Confederation"); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729,
750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[P]residential communication privilege" is "rooted in the need for
confidentiality to ensure that presidential decisionmaking is of the highest caliber, informed by
honest advice and full knowledge."). Executive-branch secrecy is equally integral to the
President's conduct of the Nation's diplomatic, foreign affairs, and law enforcement activities,
which depend for their effectiveness on some degree of confidentiality. See Robert Iraola,
Congressional Oversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for Information Relating to Federal
Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1570-80 (2002).
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little by preservation of constitutionally designated opportunities to
assert those interests. That is presumably why President Eisenhower
famously warned that disclosure of "the conversations that take place
between any responsible official and his advisors"-even (or perhaps
especially) to congressional committees-would "wreck the
government."
147
In short, "[t]he same logic which holds that Congress has the
power to investigate so that it may effectively exercise its legislative
functions, supports the proposition that the President has the power
to withhold information when the use of the power is necessary to
exercise his Executive functions effectively." 148 Both powers are
essential structural bulwarks supporting and enabling the exercise of
the remaining powers delegated to each branch. Both are therefore
indistinguishable from the powers and prerogatives implicated in
cases that the Supreme Court, without hesitation, has resolved on the
merits.
2. The Competence of the Courts
A second defense of the disparate treatment of information and
non-information disputes might differentiate between these
controversies based on the analytical methods each would require a
court to apply. Unlike conflicts over information, which call for
"delicate and possibly unseemly" predictions about the degree to which
disclosure or non-disclosure will intrude upon and impact the practical
functioning of each branch,149 non-information disputes turn on tasks
with which courts are intimately familiar: interpreting constitutional
text and structure, extracting from that analysis clear rules and
principles, and applying the resulting doctrine to statutory or
147. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
674 (1955); see also Charles Black, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1973, at 31, cols. 1-2:
It is hard for me to see how any person of common sense could think that
those consultative and decisional processes that are the essence of the
Presidency could be carried on to any good effect, if every participant spoke or
wrote in continual awareness that at any moment any Congressional
committee, or any prosecutory working with a grand jury, could at will
command the production of the verbatim record of every word written or
spoken.
Id.
148. Cox, supra note 2, at 1386.
149. United States v. AT&T ("AT&T 1'), 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see id. at 391
(noting that to resolve that case, a court "would be called upon to balance the constitutional
interests raised by the parties, including such factors as the strength of Congress's need for the
information in the request letters, the likelihood of a leak of the information in the




administrative measures. According to this view, the same judicial
competence concerns that underlie the escalation model permit a
departure from that model whenever access to information is not
involved.
However attractive it might at first appear, this second
distinction cannot rationalize the anomalous place of the escalation
model within its broader context. As an initial matter, the justification
depends on a characterization that is questionable even as to the
subset of cases it most clearly describes-those ostensibly decided
according to textual commands or clear principles derived from
constitutional structure. 150 Although those cases purportedly rested on
rigid rules, the Court held such rules applicable only after answering
questions that were far less concrete. In Chadha, for example, the
Constitution's mechanistic lawmaking process required invalidation of
the "legislative veto" only because the Court "establish[ed] that the
challenged action.., is of the kind to which the procedural
requirements of Art. I, § 7, apply."''1 1 That determination-whether
the conduct qualifies as "an exercise of legislative power"-"depends
not on th[e] form" of the action but rather on a functional evaluation of
its "character and effects," which in turn calls for an examination of
"the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch."'15
2
Similarly, the Appointments Clause component of Morrison v. Olson
appeared to rest on a definite rule: "Principal officers are selected by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior
officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by
150. This subset would presumably include the cases interpreting the lawmaking procedures
prescribed in Article I-Chadha, Bowsher, MWAA, and Clinton-and it could also extend to the
portions of Morrison v. Olson and Buckley that turned on the Court's interpretation of Article II's
Appointment Clause. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (specifying the requirements for
nominating "Officers of the United States"). Justice Kennedy has seized on this distinction
between "explicit constitutional requirement[s]" and inferred principles in attempting to
reconcile the analytically distinct double-standard arising from the Supreme Court's sporadic use
of a "balancing approach" when resolving separation-of-powers cases. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484, 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Where the branches' implied powers
collide, Justice Kennedy reasoned, the Court is justified in weighing the competing interests. But
"[wihere a power has been committed to a particular Branch of the Government in the text of the
Constitution, the balance already has been struck by the Constitution itself," and "[i]t is
improper for this Court to arrogate to itself the power to adjust [that] balance." Id. at 486.
151. INS v. Chadha, 469 U.S. 919, 952 (1982).
152. Id. at 952, 956 (citation omitted). Bowsher, although ostensibly a simple application of
the rule that Congress may not reserve a role in enforcing the laws it enacts, also turned on the
same distinction. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens noted that the Court's perfunctory
analysis "rests on the unstated and unsound premise that there is a definite line that
distinguishes executive power from legislative power." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 747
(1986); see id. at 749 n.13 ("It is fruitless.., to try to draw any sharp and logical line between
legislative and executive functions.").
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the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary."' 53 Application of that
rule was impossible, however, until the Court first decided the thorny
question of whether the Independent Counsel (the "officer" at issue in
that case) belonged in the first or second category. And as the Court
explained, "[t]he line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one
that is far from clear." 154 Because "the Framers provided little
guidance into where it should be drawn," the Court could not escape
some exploration of the Independent Counsel's duties and their effect
on the integrity of the executive branch.155 It is thus a vast
oversimplification to characterize even a portion of the decided cases
in this context as resulting from a straightforward application of self-
executing constitutional principles, devoid of delicate functional
judgments about the realities of interbranch relations.
But even if this characterization could explain some of the
executive-legislative cases the Court has decided, it could not
encompass the others in any manner that would distinguish them
from information disputes. The removal cases, like the Court's
resolution of the dispute over the Nixon papers in GSA, turned on
nothing more concrete than the Justices' own perceptions of whether
the challenged law "prevents the Executive branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," and if so,
whether that intrusion is outweighed "by an overriding need to
promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."'
156
The baldly predictive judgments this test requires are no different in
principle from those necessary to decide, for example, the validity of a
claim of executive privilege interposed against a congressional
demand. Unless there is something uniquely difficult about evaluating
the impact of information on the functioning of the branches, no
argument based on judicial competence could distinguish one situation
from the other.
The Supreme Court long ago declared its ability to evaluate the
impact of disclosure, however, in the "closely related and logically
indistinguishable" context of information disputes between the
executive and judicial branches.1 57 The best example of such a dispute
is United States v. Nixon, which famously precipitated the thirty-
seventh President's farewell from office. In that case, the Court
addressed the validity of a judicial subpoena, issued at the request of
153. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1, 132
(1976)).
154. Id. at 671.
155. Id. at 671-77.
156. See supra note 123.
157. Bishop, supra note 23, at 485.
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the Watergate Special Prosecutor (none other than Archibald Cox),
seeking documents and tape recordings of Nixon's conversations with
his aides. The Special Prosecutor argued that the tapes were critical
evidence of guilt in the trial of the President's six indicted co-
conspirators, but Nixon refused to produce them on the ground that
"the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere
insulates the President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing
criminal prosecution."
158
The Court began by emphatically rejecting the President's
claim of unreviewable authority over executive-branch information.
The answer to the constitutional question, the Court explained, lay
not in the political process, but instead in the judicial task of
"weigh[ing] the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of
Presidential communications in performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice."'159 The goal was "to resolve those
competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions
of each branch."' 60 That resolution, in turn, required a speculative
judgment about the effect of forced disclosure on the functioning of the
executive. The Court had little difficulty making such a prediction,
balancing the results of disclosure against the interests of the judicial
branch, and upholding the subpoena. Presidential advisers, the Court
reasoned, "will [not] be moved to temper the candor of their remarks
by the infrequent occasions of disclosure" in criminal cases, but "the
allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the [basic] guarantee
of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the
courts."161
This same mode of reasoning, with all the same delicate
judgments about how disclosure of information will affect the
performance of presidential duties, is manifest in several other
judicial- executive cases decided by both the Supreme Court 162 and the
158. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (internal citations omitted).
159. Id. at 711-12.
160. Id. at 707.
161. Id. at 712; see id. at 713 ("The President's broad interest in confidentiality of
communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations
preliminarily shown to have some bearing on ... pending criminal cases.").
162. See, e.g., Cheney v. U. S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 378, 382
(2004) (reversing appeals court's conclusion that it lacked power to grant mandamus dismissing
a civil action against the Vice President, and suggesting that the suit's intrusion on the executive
branch outweighed any interference in the Judiciary's function resulting from non-disclosure);
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (finding that non-disclosure by the executive
branch is appropriate where "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged").
[Vol. 60:4:10791114
2007] SAFEGUARDS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 1115
D.C. Circuit. 163 These cases plainly undermine any reliance on judicial
competence as a basis for distinguishing information disputes from
other types of controversies between Congress and the President.
Courts have willingly and confidently predicted the effects on the
executive's institutional interests of forced disclosure in criminal and
civil litigation, and there is no reason that they should suddenly
become incompetent to make the same judgments simply because the
demand for information comes in the form of a congressional, rather
than a judicial, subpoena.
164
3. The Function of Judicial Review in Interbranch Conflicts
The consideration of Nixon and interbranch conflicts
originating in the courts might, however, suggest a third justification,
this one based on the function of judicial review in a constitutional
democracy. In all of the decided cases, the constitutional question
resulted from claims brought by a private litigant, just as the
subpoena dispute in Nixon was the offshoot of an individual's criminal
trial. In each case, the Court addressed the executive-legislative
balance only as an incident to the individual claim and only because
resolution of that claim rendered it necessary. But information
disputes, the argument runs, involve purely "collective" disagreements
163. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding, based on
predictions about the effect of disclosure on the quality of advice to the President, that the
"presidential communications privilege" protecting documents from disclosure in judicial
proceedings may extend to conversations to which the President was not a party; "limiting the
privilege" to exclude such communications "would indeed impede effective functioning of the
presidency"); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding grand jury subpoena
for Nixon tapes against assertion of executive privilege).
164. Professor Cox, writing just after the Court's decision in United States v. Nixon,
disagreed with this conclusion. See Cox, supra note 2, at 1425-32. "I find marked differences,"
Cox explained, "between the questions raised by a claim of executive privilege during a judicial
proceeding and those presented by an executive refusal of a congressional demand." Id. at 1426.
Defining the rights and privileges of the Congress and President inter sese in the
legislative process has never been a judicial function. Courts are accustomed to
weighing the need for specific pieces of evidence in a judicial proceeding against the
public interest in preserving the confidentiality of particular relationships, but they
have no experience in weighing the legislative needs of Congress against other public
interests.
Id. at 1425-26. The Court's willingness to weigh legislative and executive prerogatives in the
intervening years, however, has undermined much of Cox's premise. Whatever the state of
affairs in 1974, thirty years later it is simply no longer true that courts "have no experience in
weighing the legislative needs of Congress against other public interests." Id. In any event,
Professor Cox appears later to contradict his own arguments by suggesting a clear set of rules of
the type he believes it inappropriate for courts to develop. See, e.g., id. at 1434 ("[Tlhe legislative
right should prevail in every case in which either the Senate or the House of Representatives
votes to override the Executive's objections, provided that the information is relevant to a matter
which is under inquiry and within the jurisdiction of the body issuing the subpoena, including its
constitutional jurisdiction.").
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between institutional components of government; their resolution
serves no purpose external to the immediate task of readjusting the
constitutional balance. Only the former cases, therefore, warrant
judicial resolution, for they alone further the federal courts' basic
mission of providing a forum for adjudication of individual rights.
165
Regardless how this defense is framed, its logic fails. If by
"individual rights" one means constitutionally secured individual
rights, then this justification would fail to include any of the non-
information cases it purports to describe. In none of those cases did
the aggrieved individual assert "that he was injured by an
unconstitutional [government] action that neither branch
constitutionally could have taken."166  Each instead involved a
challenge to conduct-the Postmaster's firing in Myers, the
deportation order in Chadha, the budget cancellations in Clinton-
that was acknowledged to be within the federal government's broad
constitutional power if imposed by the proper department. 167 The only
alleged constitutional infirmity, in other words, lay in the separation-
of-powers question that the Court addressed, not in an abridgment of
constitutionally protected individual rights-"those personal liberties
that are secured against all government abridgments, president or
congressional."
16 8
Conversely, if this theory invokes individual rights in either
the broader sense of "individual liberty" (defined generally as freedom
from tyrannical government) or the narrower sense of non-
constitutional individual interests, then it would fail to exclude
165. See id. at 1423 (concluding that although the Court has properly decided cases "brought
by or against a state or a private person who had a material stake in the outcome," "[tihe named
parties in an action to enforce a subpoena against a claim of executive privilege might be the
Congress or a congressional body and the President"); cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[A] dispute involving only officials, and the official interests of
those, who serve in the branches of the National Government lies far from the model of the
traditional common-law cause of action" that historically occupied the federal courts.);
Sternstein, supra note 15, at 152, 154, 160 (arguing that "[t]he courts are best equipped to
protect individual interests," but in information-access disputes "[t]he problem essentially
involves several competing collective interests" and therefore "the people through their
representative institutions ... should be allowed to choose among the claims for ascendancy").
166. CHOPER, supra note 74, at 330.
167. Id. (noting that a true claim of individual right "can be remedied only by cessation of
th[e] conduct, not merely by the constitutionally proper branch doing what the other has already
done"). For Professor Choper, the independent constitutional status of the asserted right is the
critical factor justifying judicial review. According to his "Separation Proposal," courts should
refrain from hearing challenges only to the "constitutional validity of [presidential or
congressional] action that affects individual 'freedom' in a way identical to what [the other
branch] could have done pursuant to its constitutionally delegated authority." Id. at 272. But
where one branch allegedly violates a true individual constitutional right, "then, in accord with
the Individual Rights Proposal, the Court should intervene." Id.
168. Id. at 272.
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disputes over congressional access to executive-branch information.
This shortcoming is particularly clear with respect to the broader
construction. Because the very purpose of divided government is
preservation of individual liberty, that "[1]iberty is always at stake
when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of
powers." 169 And as we have seen, information disputes, perhaps even
more so than other types of executive-legislative conflict, can shift the
interbranch balance in fundamental respects. 170 Their outcomes thus
have the potential to alter profoundly what Justice Kennedy has
called the "vertical axis" of separation of powers-the relationship
"between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must
be exercised." 1
71
Equally undeniable is the impact of information disputes on
more mundane individual interests. One of the primary bases for
presidential refusals to satisfy Congress's information demands is the
need to protect individuals from disclosure of allegations that,
"although unsubstantiated, might work irreparable injury to private
reputations."' 172 As then-Attorney General Robert Jackson explained,
the risks to individual interests are particularly grave where Congress
seeks information about prosecutorial strategy or investigative
activities over which the executive demands confidentiality.
A disclosure of [confidential] sources would embarrass informants-sometimes in their
employment, sometimes in their social relations, and in extreme cases might even
endanger their lives .... Disclosure of information contained in the reports might also be
the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads
and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people.
Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of
particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know
that a correction never catches up with an accusation.
1 7 3
169. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasis added); see id. ("Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental
insight: concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty."); Public
Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("When structure fails, liberty is always in peril.").
170. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
171. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452; see Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49
DUKE L.J. 749, 751-52 (1999).
172. Bishop, supra note 23, at 489-90; see id. at 487 (noting that among the "executive's
interest in the privacy of certain ... types of information," one "obvious example is the data,
derogatory or otherwise, in the security files of individuals"); Cox, supra note 2, at 1401-02
(noting that many historical invocations of executive privilege were intended "to protect possibly
innocent persons ... against disclosure of the rumors and loose allegations often found in
investigative reports"); id. at 1427 ("The Executive must therefore take it upon itself to protect
individuals against disclosure of untested allegations and reports.").
173. Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative Reports, 40 Op. Att'y
Gen. 45, 46-47 (1941); see Investigative Authority of the General Accounting Office, 12 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 171, 177-78 (1988) (noting the potential injury to individuals in disclosure of
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The particular individuals may be unaware that their interests
are threatened, but such a systemic impediment to recognizing and
asserting an injury is an argument in favor of judicial involvement,
not a reason to reject it.174
Information battles are therefore not "collective" controversies
in any sense that distinguishes them from other executive-legislative
cases. Neither category of conflicts implicates individual "rights," but
both impact individual liberty and interests, and both can therefore
lay an equal claim to judicial resolution consistent with the purposes
and traditions of the federal courts.
No distinction, in sum, can explain why information disputes,
alone among controversies between the President and Congress,
warrant judicial avoidance on a political-safeguards rationale. This
recognition goes far toward discrediting the escalation model, for it
reveals that the clash between that model and the Court's broader
approach is an affront not to foolish consistency but rather to the
interests in regularity and analytical coherence that hold particular
sway in matters of constitutional structure.175 Those interests-
indeed, the very foundations of the judicial method-direct that courts
identify compelling reasons to depart in a specific setting from the
approach they have adopted in the general one. The escalation model
fails this challenge.
IV. REEVALUATING THE ESCALATION MODEL AND ITS PREMISES
The escalation model's incongruous place in the separation-of-
powers context might be tolerable if there were strong reasons to trust
its theoretical and historical narratives. Despite the fact that the
broader jurisprudence has rejected its basic underpinnings, perhaps
the escalation model merits its conventional status because it presents
"unpublished details of allegations against particular individuals and details that would reveal
confidential sources").
174. In any event, an individual's inability to assert his interest has never been thought a
basis to deny a judicial forum for resolution of the controversy. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 410-11 (1991) (noting that third-party standing is appropriate when, inter alia, a party is
hindered in asserting its own interests). This argument could be recast in doctrinal terms as an
assertion that the rule of Raines v. Byrd, which held that "abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power" is insufficient to confer standing on legislative plaintiffs, should not preclude
litigation of interbranch information disputes. 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997). Even if federal officials
do not enjoy standing in their own right, but see U.S. House of Representatives v. U. S. Dep't of
Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89-90 (D.D.C. 1998) (three-judge panel) (holding that even after
Raines, deprivation of information constitutes a legally cognizable injury to the House), the
threat to third-party interests should suffice to satisfy Article III.
175. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future - Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 164-65
(1999).
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an accurate account of the interplay between constitutional structure
and political process and a persuasive claim of fidelity to original
intent. This Part thus returns as a de novo matter to the rationale and
premises underlying that model-now properly identified through the
analysis in Part II as an application of the political safeguards
theory-and asks whether they comport with history, experience, and
current scholarly understandings of the political process.
A. The Core Rationale
The basic theory of the escalation model begins with the
commonplace recognition that the Constitution divides reciprocal
powers between Congress and the President to ensure that each
serves as a check on the other. From that premise, the theory
concludes that those self-executing checks, left to deploy unfettered in
the political process, will resolve information disputes in a manner
that best reflects the constitutional balance between the branches.
176
The second proposition, however, does not flow so easily from
the first. Between them lie a number of implicit assumptions on which
a close examination, informed by the broader scholarship on political-
safeguards reasoning, casts serious doubt.
1. A Different Kind of "Checks and Balances"
Reference to the "system of checks and balances" between
Congress and the President typically denotes the established
safeguards in specific government processes that prohibit one branch
from taking unilateral action without input from the other. This "first-
order" system is designed to ensure participation in the particular
activities at which the safeguards are targeted. Thus, where a bill is
under consideration, the President possesses a veto power that
Congress may override through super-majority vote. Or, to take
another classic example, the appointment of principal executive
officers results from the combined influence of the President's
nomination power and the Senate's advice and consent function. Each
of these safeguards is a routine, intentional, and intrinsic part of the
particular process to which it applies.
The escalation model's invocation of "checks and balances,"
however, refers to a fundamentally different dynamic. The
Constitution does not grant either branch a formal or self-executing
176. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 22, at 325 ("What informs the process of congressional
access to executive branch information is the constitutional structure of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances.").
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institutional role in information disputes. The two components of such
controversies-congressional demand and presidential withholding-
operate outside of the ordinary processes governed by the first-order
system of checks and balances. Thus, a single congressional committee
can, through issuance of a subpoena, make a demand backed by legal
process for information within the executive branch. 177 That action
does not require broader legislative approval, nor (because
congressional subpoenas are not subject to the presentment
requirement) is it vulnerable to presidential veto. 178 By the same
token, whether to assert executive privilege in response to such a
subpoena is wholly within the President's discretion. No constitutional
process channels that decision or affords Congress any prescribed role.
Because information disputes circumvent formal constitutional
processes, the first-order system of checks and balances cannot dictate
their outcomes. Instead, the escalation model depends on a second-
order system, in which the safeguards of the first order are converted
for collateral use as tools of coercion or deterrence. The President has
no conclusive means of vindicating an assertion of executive privilege,
but he can threaten to use his veto power over unrelated legislation if
Congress does not relent. Congress, in turn, can attempt to force
disclosure of information by refusing to confirm nominees with no
connection to the dispute or by denying funds for programs that are
particularly important to the President. In this way, prerogatives
intended to ensure interbranch participation in formal processes take
on an entirely different character in information disputes: They
become weapons through which each branch can pressure the other to
bend to its will. 179
This distinction points to a critical aspect of information
disputes that a facile reference to "checks and balances" cannot
capture. The first-order system is self-executing and dispositive: A
177. SENATE RULE XXVI(1), STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE; HOUSE RULE XI(2)(m)(1)(B),
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 110th Cong. (2007).
178. Presentment is constitutionally required only for "Bill[s] which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. For an argument that the
long-neglected Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause also requires presentment of congressional
subpoenas, see Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement
for Congressional Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1373, 1374 (2005).
179. See Dinh, supra note 18, at 353 (defending the escalation model by arguing that
Congress may "extort [desired] information from the executive by deploying this arsenal of
coercive legislative weapons"). This second-order system is not, of course, exclusive to
information disputes. Raw-power struggles routinely and appropriately determine the outcome of
political disagreements between the President and Congress on a wide variety of matters. The
point is that in information disputes, the self-executing first-order system is entirely unavailable,
and therefore neither branch possesses any dispositive means of vindicating its interests in that
context.
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presidential veto defeats proposed legislation unless Congress can
override it, just as the President cannot permanently appoint a
principal officer whom Congress rejects. Although political
considerations inform the decision whether to invoke each of these
prerogatives, once that decision is made, no amount of political will is
necessary to ensure that the checks succeed, nor can any amount of
muscle defeat them. The second-order system that governs
information disputes, however, depends entirely on this sort of
political muscle and will. Congress cannot, simply by rejecting a
president's prize judicial nominee, overcome an "unrelated" assertion
of executive privilege; such a "check" will prevail only to the extent
that Congress's will to force disclosure exceeds that of the White
House to fight it. Information disputes therefore do not resemble the
orderly processes of government that "checks and balances," construed
in the first-order sense, channel and control. They are instead naked
power struggles, raw "contests for political advantage."18 0
2. Political Motives, Constitutional Interests
The escalation model posits that the outcomes of these
unrestrained power struggles will, in the words of the D.C. Circuit,
optimally reflect the "country's constitutional balance." 181  That
conclusion is warranted, however, only if the constitutional interests
of each branch in some way inform those disputes. Unless such
interests are a significant part of the mix, information disputes are
purely political disagreements yielding purely political answers-
"politics in, politics out."
The force of the escalation model therefore depends on one of
two assumptions. The combatants in an information dispute must
either act out of conscious motivation to further the long-term
constitutional interests of the branch they represent, or their actions,
although motivated by other considerations, must in fact further those
interests in a systematic and reliable way.
180. Cox, supra note 2, at 1420, 1432; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and
the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1375-76 (1999) ("[T]he scope of
executive privilege, as an incident of the autonomy of the executive from the other branches, is a
function of the circumstances of any particular situation and the vigor with which the executive
branch resists the demands... for information or materials concerning confidential executive
branch deliberations.., and the result of the struggles between or among the branches on this
point ... ").
181. United States v. AT&T ("AT&Tf'), 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives
The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts
of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study
them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political
calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake.
One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained
that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced:
The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the
presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a
certain theory of the Constitution .... The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the
presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would
include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing
purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and
their allies. 
18 2
Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political
branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution
independently of the courts,18 3  acknowledges that politics and
''practical considerations" typically override the legal and
constitutional principles implicated in information disputes.18 4 In his
view, although debate about congressional access and executive
privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the
messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the
issue."18 5 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied
such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact
depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political
182. Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 35
("[W]hen the costs to the president (and to those of his advisors with a broader responsibility for
governance than that allocated to separation-of-powers lawyers) become significant, we should
expect the lawyers' legal principles to be compromised or abandoned."). Even the Office of Legal
Counsel, which has historically served as a politically insulated, quasi-judicial expositor of
constitutional interests within the executive branch, approaches the assertion of executive
privilege as "a practical undertaking that is not governed by fixed rules but by considerations of
prudence that take into account political factors such as public reaction." Legislation Providing
for Court-Ordered Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials to Congressional Committees, 9 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 86, 93 (1985).
183. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL
PROCESS 3 (1988) (arguing generally that "constitutional law is not a monopoly of the judiciary");
Nancy Kassop, The Courts and the Political Branches: Interpretation, Accommodation, and
Autonomy, in POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE Louis FISHER CONNECTION 55, 63 (Robert
J. Spitzer, ed., 2000) ("One of Fisher's Hallmark contributions to the study of constitutional law
is his firm belief in interpretation outside of the courts.").
184. Fisher, supra note 22, at 323.
185. Louis Fisher, Even When The White House Yells Privilege, The Constitution Yields To
Politics, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004.
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considerations.' 8 6 When the participants "get institutional," Shane
observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult."'1 7
b. Compatibility of Political Incentives and Institutional Interests
If the actors in an information dispute readily discard
constitutional principle for political expediency, what then of the
notion that political expediency nevertheless furthers constitutional
interest as its incidental but inevitable result? This, of course, is the
premise of Madison's Federalist 51, in which the escalation model
places ultimate faith. According to this theory, the key to maintaining
the constitutional balance between the branches is to "giv[e] to those
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."'88 The
agents of each branch will act out of individual interest and political
"ambition," but the effect of their behavior will be to aggrandize their
respective departments. "The interest of the man," in Madison's
famous words, is intrinsically "connected with the constitutional
rights of the place."'1 9 This coupling of personal ambition and
institutional interest is the core rationale driving the escalation
model's self-executing system of interbranch boundary control.
But this rationale is also the focus of a growing body of
scholarship attacking the basic premise of "incentive-compatibility" on
which the political safeguards theory centrally rests. 190  That
scholarship began in earnest a decade ago with Dean Kramer's
observation that although Garcia "left us with a system of federalism
that depends overwhelmingly on the political process to ensure an
appropriate balance between state and federal governments," scholars
had yet to understand "how [that process] protect[s] state and federal
interests" and knew "amazingly little about the politics of allocating
power."'19 Dean Kramer filled those gaps in two important respects.
First, he recognized that the aspects of constitutional design that the
political safeguards theory traditionally emphasizes do not, in fact,
systematically harness the ambitions of federal officeholders in the
186. Shane, supra note 48, at 220 ("A problem is most likely to occur when one or the other
branch behaves as if the stakes in a particular dispute include an overall adjustment in the
relationship between the two branches.").
187. Id. at 220-22, 226 (noting that negotiations often break down when the parties focus on
"presidential obligation and congressional prerogative").
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
189. Id. at 322.
190. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 95-99 (1999)
(reframing the political safeguards theory in terms of incentive-compatibility).




service of the states' interests. 192 And second, he emphasized that one
can understand the dynamics of the political process only by shifting
the focus from "formal institutional arrangements"-the federal and
state governments as personified actors-"to a more explic[i]t concern
with the incentives of [individual] lawmakers, that is, to politics.
193 If
we truly want to understand how the political process allocates
authority between nation and state, Kramer argued, we need to
examine how the ambitions of officeholders are actually "shaped by
the political culture in which they live and the intermediate
institutions through which they work.1 94
Dean Kramer's work prompted further critiques of the political
safeguards rationale, and in particular its assumption of an inherent
compatibility between the pursuit of political ambition and the
advancement of institutional interest. 195 That scholarship also set the
stage for the path-breaking work of Professor Levinson, who has both
broadened and refined Kramer's insights about the critical importance
of focusing on the real political incentives of individual officeholders.
The core conclusion that emerges from Levinson's work has obvious
implications for the escalation model: Whether we are talking about
the relationship of the federal government to the states or that of the
branches to one another, "[t]elling a persuasive story about how these
political actors pursuing their various interests will generate the kind
of self-aggrandizing institutions that constitutional law and theory
envision turns out to be quite difficult. ' 96
i. Madisonian Ambition
The self-interest of federal officeholders is principally the
product of two complementary and overlapping forces. The first is
what Madison simply termed "ambition"-the unalloyed desire for
political and personal power. Intuitive appeal and scholarly consensus
notwithstanding, "we should not be too quick to assume that a thirst
192. Id. at 1520 (concluding that "[tihe structural protections identified by Wechsler, Choper,
and company are marginal at best" in maintaining an optimal balance between federal and state
government). Dean Kramer ultimately concluded that political parties replaced the original
"safeguards" in the Garcia model, protecting the states by linking the political fortunes of state
and federal officeholders. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 292 (2000).
193. Kramer, supra note 191, at 1521.
194. Id. at 1522.
195. See, e.g., Prakash & Yoo, supra note 105, at 1479 (noting that the "distinction between
the constitutional rights of states and their temporary political interests means that we cannot
expect the states to always defend federalism," and that states "will often be tempted by political
circumstances to sacrifice federalism for some temporary advantage").
196. Levinson, supra note 133, at 920.
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for power at the level of individual officials will aggregate to
aggrandizement at the institutional level."'197 Close analysis of this
dynamic reveals that an official's ambition in fact frustrates the
constitutional interests of his branch at least as often as it furthers
them.
Power and ambition can be defined many ways. To the extent
political power is measured by the achievement of policy objectives,
federal officials will often find it more fruitful to defer either to the
"opposing" branch or to entities entirely outside of government. 198
Senators hawkish about the War on Terror, for example, will favor
broad presidential authority to define and deter domestic security
threats, just as a president for whom environmental interests are a
lower priority will push for industry self-regulation over executive
agency oversight. 199 Each of these actions will serve an official's
ambition by advancing his agenda, but each will also diminish the
authority and prerogatives of his institution.
Ambition can also assume more selfish forms: the desire for
enhanced personal standing and the aspiration for higher office.
Pursuit of this sort of ambition bears only a coincidental connection to
the furtherance of constitutional prerogatives. Most important, the
force of party loyalty bridges the legislative-executive divide in ways
that often undermine the institution involved.200 Political parties rule
the fortunes of federal officeholders, divvying up access to the ballot,
leadership positions within institutions, and indispensable support in
seeking higher office. A legislator eager for the spoils of political
success will therefore fare much better choosing party over branch
where the two pull in opposite directions. The most obvious
manifestation of this common-sense observation is the willingness of
Congress, during periods of unified government, to cede core
components of its constitutional authority in the service of the ruling
party.201
197. Id. at 927-28.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 928.
200. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2317, 2327 (2006) (exploring the effect of political parties on the relationship
between the legislative and executive branches); Levinson, supra note 133, at 952-53
(emphasizing the important influence of party loyalty on congressional behavior); Robert Cooter,
Who Gets on Top in Democracy? Elections as Filters, 10 S. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 139-40 (2002)
(noting that when one political party controls both the legislature and the executive, party
structure undermines the separation of powers).
201. Examples of this phenomenon abound. One of the more noteworthy in recent memory
was the serious consideration by Republican legislators of the so-called "nuclear option," which
would have significantly diluted the Senate's role in shaping the composition of the judicial
branch. Melanie Kirkpatrick, And the Nominees Are..., WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2004, at A23
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Two subsidiary points further attenuate the link between
ambition and institutional interest. First, the search for power will
typically drive officeholders to compete within institutions, not against
the opposing branch. "Surely a power-maximizing Senator," Professor
Levinson observes, "would receive a higher return on her investment
of political capital by angling for a powerful committee chair than by
pushing for some procedural innovation, like a legislative veto, that
marginally shifts power to the Senate as an institution."202
Competition along this internal axis is unlikely to aggrandize the
institution in which it takes place. Second, politics is an inherently
fluid profession in which individuals routinely move from one branch
to another. The inevitable result is a reduced sense of identification
with that individual's current branch and a concomitantly lessened
incentive to defend its prerogatives. 20 3
Each of these general observations applies a fortiori where the
branches collide over access to information. Party loyalty will
consistently deter legislators from forcing a friendly president to
assert executive privilege, especially when the only mechanism for
coercing disclosure is the defeat of nominees or bills that the
legislators themselves presumably favor. For the same reasons, the
incentive of a president politically aligned with Congress to defend the
secrecy of executive-branch information will lag far behind the true
institutional interests in doing so. Internal competition within the
branches will not temper this effect, and mobility between them will
only exacerbate it: A legislator with presidential aspirations will have
little to gain by attacking the constitutional interests of the office he
hopes to occupy, just as an agency head with the opposite ambitions
will hesitate before precipitating a showdown with Congress over the
confidentiality of executive files.
ii. Public Opinion
A second force, implicit in the first but worthy of separate
emphasis, uniquely undermines the political safeguards rationale in
the particular context of information disputes. In a democracy,
"[g]overnment behavior is driven at least as much by the interests of
constituents as by the self-interested preferences of their
representatives."'20 4 The "interest of the man," in other words, is
largely determined by the preferences of the voting public. Even if the
("Senate rules would be reinterpreted so that 51 votes, not a supermajority of 60, would be
needed to end debate on judicial nominees and move to an up-or-down vote on the floor.").
202. Levinson, supra note 133, at 928.
203. Id. at 929.
204. Id. at 922.
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ambition of an officeholder aligned closely with the constitutional
interests of his branch, the official could pursue such ambitious
motives only to the extent that his constituents agreed with his
position. 2
05
Public perceptions of merit thus play a critical role in the
resolution of information disputes. The nature of the second-order
system of checks and balances means that the prevailing branch will
be the one that enjoys the popular support necessary to invoke and
sustain the coercive collateral measures with which such disputes are
fought. Accordingly, the theoretical coherence of the escalation model
depends not only on the positive correlation of ambition and
constitutional interest, but also on a close link between the reality and
the perception of constitutional merit-between the answer the
Constitution contemplates and the answer the voting public wants.
For two reasons-one structural, one historical-such a link
simply does not exist. The distribution of public support in an
information dispute is unlikely to track in any reliable way the
constitutional validity of the competing positions. First, public
sentiment about the substantive controversy that gives rise to the
information conflict will almost invariably eclipse any interest in the
conflict itself. "Separation of powers issues are not the sort that voters
get exercised about";20 6 voters do, however, pay close attention to the
debates-about war, national security, or high-profile appointments-
that spawn arguments over access to information. Thus, to cite but
one example, where a president enjoys broad popular support on his
military agenda, the voting public is unlikely to back Congress's
demand for related White House documents, even where the
constitutional balance would plainly favor such access.
Second, to the extent the public does focus specifically on
information-access issues, considerations external to the particular
conflict are likely to jaundice its views. Ironically, the case that
formally recognized executive privilege, United States v. Nixon,20 7 also
severely crippled the ability of future presidents to invoke it for valid
reasons. The impact of the Nixon presidency reverberates with every
mention of executive privilege, and any effort to protect the
confidentiality of White House papers prompts charges of conspiracy,
205. See id. at 929-32 ("[U]nless empire-building systematically benefits not just officials, but
also the voters and interest groups who make up their constituencies, it is probably a poor
candidate for the starring role in which it has been cast by constitutional law and theory.").
206. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 175 n.34 (1993).
207. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638 (1974), discussed supra text accompanying notes
157-61.
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corruption, and cover-up. 208 Media fuel this suspicion, not only because
the fourth estate is a powerful institutional lobby in favor of
disclosure, 20 9 but also because the modern twenty-four-hour cable
news cycle feeds on rumors of high-level malfeasance. The result, as
one commentator has put it, is that "the purported trump card in the
President's hand, the claim of executive privilege, is actually a joker,"
because "even a meritorious assertion of privilege can harm the
president's political standing."210 Congress, by contrast, can score
political points by forcing the President to invoke that privilege, even
if the information demand that prompts the response is abusive or
frivolous.211 This dynamic represents a serious distortion of the
incentives the escalation model presupposes. Where Congress can
sustain a constitutionally suspect information demand because of the
political ramifications, not despite them, the mechanism at the core of
the escalation model breaks down.
212
The point, however, is not that the political process
systematically advantages one branch over the other. Some forces in
that process, such as the political salience of the President and his
agenda, clearly favor the executive. Others, such as the public's
equation of confidentiality with corruption, just as clearly aid
208. See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow,
83 MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1999) ("Every President who has asserted executive privilege since
[Nixon] has been subject to unflattering characterizations that he is engaging in Nixonian tactics
to conceal and deceive."). For examples of this phenomenon, see Miller, supra note 9, at 638-39
(describing the difficulty with which President Clinton met in trying to withhold documents
relating to Whitewater on the ground of executive privilege); see also id. at 657-68 (describing
similar difficulties faced by President Reagan).
209. See Marshall, supra note 9, at 810-11.
210. Id. at 811. white House officials from both parties have confirmed this observation.
President Clinton's White House Counsel, for example, explained that "the current state of
politics is such that, certainly since Richard Nixon, if there's anything that Congress really
wants whatever the status of the law of executive privilege, I don't think a president can
withstand the political pressure put on to turn things over." Ellen Nakishama & Dan Eggen,
White House Seeks to Restore Its Privileges; Congress Finding Bush Administration Strongly
Resists Some Requests for Internal Documents, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2001, at A2. Likewise,
President Reagan, explaining his decision to allow congressional access to documents that had
sparked a heated interbranch dispute, stated, "I can no longer insist on executive privilege if
there is a suspicion in the minds of the American people that it is being used to cover up
wrongdoing." Daniel Benjamin, Mutually Assured Corruption, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at 12.
211. Cf. Marshall, supra note 9, at 811 (noting that "invocation [of executive privilege] is
often so damaging to a President that forcing the President to claim it can mark the victory of his
opponents by itself); Miller, supra note 9, at 674 ("Because Congress's interests are adverse to
those of the executive when a committee request is met with an assertion of executive privilege,
Congress's institutional objectives and ego extinguish objectivity vis-a-vis executive interests.").
212. Cf. Office of Legal Counsel, Legislation Providing for Court-Ordered Disclosure of
Grand Jury Materials to Congressional Committees, 9 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 86, 92 (1985)
(stating that for Congress, "negotiations for access to documents over which there was a potential
claim of executive privilege ... have entailed both the expenditure of time and political capital").
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Congress. The point, rather, is that none of those forces are plausible
proxies for the important constitutional interests implicated in
disputes over information. The ambitions of executive and legislative
actors do not correlate in any systematic way with the constitutional
prerogatives of the branches they serve, and the public perceptions
that shape and channel those ambitions assign to the competing
arguments political values that are unrelated, if not inverse, to
constitutional merit. Contrary to Madison's theory and conventional
belief, in short, the "interest of the man" in seeking or denying access
to information is not logically "connected to the constitutional rights of
the place." As a result, there is no reason to believe-and every reason
to doubt-that the political process will yield constitutionally optimal
outcomes to information disputes.
B. The Anti-Judicial Premises
The escalation model is not just an account of why the political
process resolves information conflicts in a manner reflective of the
constitutional balance. It is also fundamentally an account of why
courts cannot replicate, and therefore should not attempt to usurp,
that function. Three premises collectively support this anti-judicial
thesis. According to those premises, resolution of information disputes
is outside the judiciary's proper domain because courts lack the
requisite abilities to decide those cases, because their decisions will
disrupt and distort interbranch dynamics, and because the Framers
did not prescribe them such a role.2 13 This Section evaluates each
premise in turn, concluding that none alone-nor all in concert-can
salvage a model gutted of its core rationale.
1. Inability to Identify and Balance Interests
The first of these premises-the attack on judicial
competence-falls along with the escalation model's basic rationale. It
may be true, as this premise asserts, that judicial reasoning will fail
precisely to discern the real interests of each branch in a particular
information dispute, and it may further be true that "mushy judicial
balancing test[s] ''214 are an inelegant means of deciding which of those
interests should prevail. 215 But the question of competence is
necessarily relative: Are judicial resolutions-imperfect though they
213. See supra notes 19- 28 and accompanying text.
214. Paulsen, supra note 180, at 1341.
215. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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are-more satisfactory as a constitutional matter than the outcomes
that result from the political process?
The collapse of the escalation model's underlying theory of
incentive-compatibility, combined with the Supreme Court's general
approach to executive-legislative conflict, points to a clear answer. As
Part III demonstrated, courts have employed the tools of judicial
analysis to identify and weigh competing institutional interests in
materially indistinguishable contexts and with results deemed good
enough for government work.216 One can at least say with confidence
that courts purport to focus on the constitutional interests at stake
(even if they sometimes lack perfect insight) and look to constitutional
principles for the proper balance (even if the result may sometimes
seem tenuous). The political process, however, does not warrant even
this modest level of confidence. Part IV.A demonstrated that the
outcomes of unmediated information disputes are keyed to the
political incentives of the participants and the preferences of the
voting public, neither of which correlates in any reliable way with
constitutional interest or principle. 217 Simply put, between these two
alternatives-a system that imperfectly answers the right question
and a system that perfectly answers the wrong one-the choice seems
plain.
2. The Destabilizing Effect of Judicial Precedent
Much the same logic defeats the second premise, which
eschews judicial involvement on the ground that "[i]nterjecting the
principled decisions of the courts into" the ongoing dialogue between
Congress and the President "would tend to prejudice future choices
between given collective interests when the options of the majoritarian
branches should remain unimpaired."218 This premise loses all
persuasive force when one recognizes that purely political outcomes
distort the constitutional balance as often as they reflect it. Like the
competence question, this issue is ultimately comparative, and if
adjudicated resolutions are constitutionally preferable to politically
negotiated ones, then binding judicial precedent is not a wrench in the
well-oiled interbranch machinery, but rather an indispensable tool in
preserving the balance between Congress and the President.
These observations suffice to rebut the claim that judicial
precedent has no place in battles over information. But this second
premise nevertheless merits closer examination because it provides a
216. See supra notes 149-164 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 182-212 and accompanying text.
218. Sternstein, supra note 15, at 162; see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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useful window through which to assess the basic normative position at
the heart of the escalation model. Central to the preference for fluidity
over fixed principles is a judgment that the constitutional line
between congressional power to obtain information and presidential
power to withhold it not only is, but ought to be, a politically and
historically contingent one. According to Louis Fisher, "the messy
political realities of the moment ... usually decide the issue," and that
is how it should be: "Attempts to announce precise constitutional
boundaries between the two branches, indicating when Congress can
and cannot have information, are not ... even desirable."219 "To be
sure," another commentator writes, "the relative powers of Congress
and the President would change over time if interbranch disputes
were generally negotiated rather than litigated,"220 but the dispositive
role of "political contingencies" counts among the escalation model's
"several advantages over reliance upon the courts."221 Thus, according
to this normative proposition, as the President's poll numbers climb,
the hegemony of the executive branch over information should expand.
When, on the other hand, Congress is the favored branch, legislators
should be permitted to peer deeper into the executive's internal affairs
and deliberations.
222
That proposition undeniably offers some intuitive appeal: The
branch that holds the people's trust and confidence, it would seem,
should have greater authority to decide whether disclosure serves the
public interest. But the proposition just as undeniably runs contrary
to the ordinary preference in matters of constitutional structure.
Capturing the general presumption, Professor Tribe has written that
the need for constancy and stability is nowhere greater than in
matters of governmental design: the "mechanical rules under which
government is to be organized and the concrete steps the government's
separate levels and branches must take" in discharging their
constitutionally prescribed duties.223  The Supreme Court has
expressed the same preference for "high walls and clear distinctions"
219. Fisher, supra note 185.
220. Entin, supra note 16, at 223.
221. Id. at 221.
222. Professor Rozell captures this general premise:
Our constitutional system cannot guarantee certitude with regard to how
every information policy dispute in government will be resolved. Nor should
it. Two executive privilege claims that, on the surface, appear equally valid
may be treated very differently from one another given different
circumstances (e.g., political composition of Congress, membership of a
particular investigating committee, popularity of the President, etc.).
ROZELL, supra note 18, at 153-54.
223. Tribe, supra note 175, at 164-65.
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between the relative powers of the branches, precisely because
anything less might shift in "the heat of interbranch conflict."
224
Indeed, further reflection suggests that the escalation model's
preference for a politically contingent allocation of authority may have
it precisely backward. As Professor Cox himself recognized, the
"[a]bility to determine what information is released, even within
narrow limits, gives enormous power to influence political affairs.
225
Thus, instead of moderating the effects of political fortune, the
escalation model amplifies them. It bestows upon the dominant
branch yet another "potent political weapon"226-access to or control
over critical information-and therefore accelerates the accumulation
of power in the body whose agenda is already least constrained by the
external check of a watchful public.
That effect undermines what is generally considered the
fundamental purpose of divided government: to foster accountability
between the branches and thereby protect the people from arbitrary
and oppressive rule.227 Applied to this context, that rationale would
dictate an inverse relationship between the branches' relative political
standing and their power over information. Precisely at those times
when the public is most willing blindly to trust the executive,
Congress's ability to obtain information necessary to oversee the
President's activities should be most robust. By the same token, the
executive's ability to preserve confidences over internal deliberations,
and thus to function effectively as an independent branch capable of
checking congressional excess, is most essential when the President's
political standing plummets. 228 The basic concept of a tripartite
system thus provides a compelling reason to doubt the wisdom of a
224. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995).
225. Cox, supra note 2, at 1431.
226. Id. at 1433.
227. See Brown, supra note 109, at 1514 (arguing that the separation of powers "is a vital
part of a constitutional organism whose final cause is the protection of individual rights"); cf.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937) ("The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.").
228. As Professor Johnsen explains, "[i]n times of constitutional crisis and a weakened
presidency, assertions of executive privilege become particularly easy targets. It is precisely
during such times of difficulty, however, that respect for the principle of executive privilege, and
maintaining a principled approach to the application of the privilege, is most critical." Johnsen,
supra note 24, at 1140. Somewhat curiously, Professor Johnsen's recognition of the need for a
mediating force in times of interbranch imbalance does not dissuade her from the escalation-
model camp. "The institutional conflicts and political motivations sometimes inherent in this
aspect of the relationship between the President and Congress," she argues, "are best resolved
through a process that allows for flexibility, a balancing of competing interests, and
compromise." Id. at 1139.
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model that, by its very design, compounds the power imbalance
between the branches during times of crisis-whether the result is to
give Congress the ability to micromanage a weakened presidency by
prying into its innermost deliberations, or instead to give a dominant
executive the power to hide even its most suspect conduct from
congressional scrutiny.
3. Original Intent
The final pillar of the escalation model is its claim of fidelity to
original intent. What precisely the Founders believed about the nature
of judicial review is, of course, a vast subject, one that occupies
volumes of scholarship. 229 This Article does not purport to join that
broad debate-nor need it do so, because proponents of the escalation
model themselves generally eschew a full consideration of the
historical record.
We will instead focus on the source that generally begins and
ends originalist justifications of the escalation model: the Founding-
era writings of James Madison. In Federalist No. 49, for example,
Madison argued that because the branches are "perfectly coordinate,"
none of them "can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling
the boundaries between their respective powers."230 The replacement
for judicial supervision of the boundaries between the branches,
Madison explained in the oft-quoted passage of Federalist 51, was to
be a self-reinforcing system of "opposite and rival interests" shaped by
the force of ambition set against competing ambition. A preference-if
not a command-for political over judicial resolution of interbranch
disputes is even more apparent in another passage that escalation-
model proponents often overlook. "There is not one Government,"
Madison argued,
in which provision is made for a particular authority to determine the limits of the
constitutional division of power between the branches of the Government. In all systems
there are points which must be adjusted by the departments themselves, to which no
one of them is competent. If it cannot be determined in this way, there is no resource left
but the will of the community, to be collected in some mode to be provided by the
[C]onstitution.
2 3 1
The historical record, however, is not nearly so conclusive as
these selective passages suggest. Indeed, even were the evidentiary
229. See, e.g., ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989);
SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990); Dean Alfange,
Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of
Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329.
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 255 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
231. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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universe limited to Madison's own writings, as escalation model
proponents sometimes appear to assume, the picture would be far
from clear. On the judicial role in defining interbranch boundaries,
Madison "was guilty, and guilty as a matter of public record, of about
as complete inconsistency ... as was possible."232 Ten years after
declaring on the House floor the branches' equality in interpretive
matters, he appeared to reverse course, acknowledging that "the
judicial department is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of
the Constitution, to decide in the last resort ... in relation to the
authorities of the other Departments of the [federal] Government."2
33
And by the time he retired to Montpelier, Madison had adopted a
position almost directly opposed to the statements from which the
escalation model seeks to draw historical legitimacy: "[I]t may always
be expected that the judicial bench, when happily filled, will ... most
engage the respect and reliance of the public as the surest expositor of
the Constitution ... in questions within its cognizance concerning the
boundaries between the several departments." 234
But even if we ignore Madison's "rapid changing of mind, 235
crediting only those assertions that support the escalation model,
contemporary evidence of original intent cuts against his views. The
more general predicate to Madison's argument-that each branch
enjoys coordinate authority to determine the extent of its own
powers-immediately confronts Marbury v. Madison, which has been
construed as emphatically declaring, little more than a decade after
Madison's protestations to the contrary, that courts are the ultimate
arbiters of constitutional meaning.236 If the Framers intended Article
232. 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1011 (1953); see also CHOPER, supra note 74, at 242; Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison
and Judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 158, 158 (1957) (noting that between 1787 and 1800,
Madison took a "bewildering number of positions on the question of interpretation of the
Constitution").
233. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 294 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
234. 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 350 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
& Co. 1867).
235. Ketcham, supra note 232, at 159. Professor Paulsen disputes the inconsistency in
Madison's views, attributing the appearance of a shift to Madison's recognition "that the
judiciary generally would be the last branch to act of a particular question by virtue of the order
in which the branches' respective powers would be exercised." Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 235 (1994)
(emphasis in original). Even Professor Paulsen is forced to admit, however, that "Madison's
views changed over time," id. at 235 n.53, and that Madison's post-ratification views "form the
strongest evidence against [Paulsen's] thesis" attacking the modern assumption of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation. Id. at 309. A definitive answer for present purposes
is unnecessary; it is enough to ask, as Professor Paulsen does, "[i]f Madison himself would not
take the premise of [interpretive coordinacy] so far, how can we?" Id.
236. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803). The contemporaneous
meaning of Marbury is, of course, the focus of intense and sophisticated debate. Recent
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III to bestow the authority, indeed the duty, to invalidate legislation
that exceeds Article I, then presumably they also intended courts to
exercise that authority where the political branches seek to cross the
constitutional boundary separating them.
That reading of original intent finds strong support in another
source of "contemporaneous and weighty evidence of [the
Constitution's] true meaning," the debates of the First Congress. 237
The lengthy discussions that culminated in the "Decision of 1789"
focused on a classic question of the boundary between executive and
legislative authority: whether the power to remove executive officers
resided in the President alone, in the Senate alone, or in some
combination of the two. A recurring subject in that debate was
whether the House of Representatives should express an opinion on
the constitutional issue. Madison's position is well known:238 He
argued strenuously in favor of the President's sole removal power and
insisted that the House should decide the question for itself since the
courts, in his view, did not have authority to settle it.239
Madison's colleagues, however, repeatedly disagreed with his
minor premise. Elbridge Gerry, for example, would have left the issue
to the Senate and President (the House, he thought, "ha[d] nothing to
do with it"), and if they disagreed, "let it go before the proper tribunal;
the judges are the constitutional umpires on such questions."240
Congressman Smith of South Carolina concurred, blasting any
"legislative construction" as "an infringement of the powers of the
Judiciary," which alone had authority "in expounding the
constitution."241 Others thought that a decision by the House could do
no harm, since, in the words of Representative Sylvester, "[i]t is
scholarship contends that, in fact, the case "broke no new ground in the theory or practice of
judicial review" and announced only the proposition "that courts had the same duty and the
same obligation to enforce the Constitution as everyone else, both inside and outside of
government." Larry D. Kramer, We the Court, 115 HARv L. REV. 4, 89-90 (2001); see also Paulsen,
supra note 235, at 245 (arguing that the structure of Marbury actually "proves the case for
coordinate review by all branches, not judicial supremacy").
237. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888), overruled in part on other
grounds, Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); see also Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984) (citing the First Congress' provision for congressional chaplains as
evidence that such a practice does not violate the Establishment Clause); Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 573-74 (1933) (relying on the Judiciary Act of 1789 as evidence of
constitutional meaning).
238. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115 (1926) (recounting the debates and
Madison's arguments).
239. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) ("I beg to know, upon what principles
it can be contended, that any one department draws from the constitution greater powers than
another, in making out the limits of the powers of the several departments?").
240. Id. at 491-92.
241. Id. at 488-89.
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certain that the Judiciary will be better able to decide the question of
constitutionality in this way than any other"; "if we are wrong,"
Sylvester reasoned, "they can correct our error."242 Even those, such as
Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, who opined that it would "be improper
to leave this question to the judges" did so not because they agreed
with Madison on that point, but rather because they feared "much
inconvenience if the President does not exercise this prerogative until
it is decided by the courts of justice."
243
These views were neither isolated nor anomalous. Rather, they
ran as a thread throughout the House deliberations, with legislator
after legislator standing to urge his colleagues to "leave the
constitution to the proper expositors of it."244 And although these
debates only scratch the surface of the historical record on the subject,
they do point to an assumption contrary to the unexamined premise so
commonly cited in support of the escalation model. A significant
portion of Madison's contemporaries appear to have assumed-as
Madison himself later came to believe-that the courts, not the
political process, would determine the constitutional balance among
the branches. There is no hint that interbranch disputes over access to
information were somehow excepted from that general principle.
CONCLUSION
Professor Cox, as it turns out, was more prescient than those
who built upon his work. He was keenly aware of the perils presented
by a system in which access to information is purely a function of
political ambition and public sentiment. Indeed, he had seen those
dangers first-hand-in President Nixon's repeated claims of executive
confidentiality, in the misdeeds that such claims both enabled and
concealed, and in the resulting harm inflicted upon the country.
"Secrecy, if sanctified by a plausible claim of constitutional privilege,"
Cox had learned, "is the easiest solution to a variety of problems. The
242. Id. at 585; see id. at 582 (Baldwin) ("Gentlemen say it properly belongs to the Judiciary
to decide this question. Be it so. It is their province to decide upon our laws; and if they find this
clause to be unconstitutional, they will not hesitate to declare it so..
243. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 572 (Page); see, e.g., id. at 489 (Boudinot) ("A great deal of mischief has arisen in
the several States, by the Legislatures undertaking to decide constitutional questions. Sir, it is
the duty of the Legislature to make the laws; your judges are to expound them."); id. at 477
(Smith) ("[T]he question of right, if it is one, [should be] left to the decision of the Judiciary .... I
conceive it can properly be brought before that tribunal; the officer will have a right to a
mandamus to be restored to his office, and the judges would determine whether the President
exercised a constitutional authority or not."); id. at 485 (White) ("I would rather the Judiciary
should decide the point, because it is more properly within their department."); id. at 486 (White)
("[I]f any one supposes himself injured by their determination, let him have recourse to the law,
and its decision will establish the true construction of the constitution.").
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claim of privilege is a useful way of hiding inefficiency,
maladministration, breach of trust or corruption, and also a variety of
potentially controversial executive practices not authorized by
Congress."
245
The intervening decades have certainly borne witness to those
warnings, but experience has also revealed that excessive presidential
confidentiality is only one possible manifestation of the danger the
escalation model poses. The broader concern is that disagreements of
profound and enduring constitutional significance continue to turn
entirely on the political pressures of the moment. Bargaining in a
stark partisan glare, unmediated by even the shadow of judge-made
law or the prospect of judicial resolution, the branches have prevailed
or surrendered in these disputes depending on considerations that
have nothing to do with a principled application of constitutional
structure. The resulting pattern, moreover, has been one of
alternating extremes. Episodes of presidential popularity have
permitted increases in secrecy, leading to malfeasance that is
uncovered only after political fortunes have changed. The aftermath of
those revelations, in turn, prompts intense congressional scrutiny that
too often devolves into a political tool rather than an earnest effort to
conduct oversight. This ongoing cycle of executive and legislative
excess is hardly the salutary process that Madison envisioned; the
damage to good government that occurs at its crests and troughs is
simply too great. Courts must provide a moderating influence,
stabilizing the flow of information between the branches in a way that
political safeguards alone cannot.
245. Cox, supra note 2, at 1433.
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